Tyrus McNair v. United States, 962 F.3d 367

In 2003 McNair was sentenced for a serious federal drug offense; the district court placed him in Criminal History Category II based on a 1992 Indiana conviction for driving without a license, increasing his Guidelines range and resulting in a 360-month sentence.
At sentencing and on direct appeal McNair disputed the state conviction; the district court (citing Custis) declined to entertain a collateral attack on the state conviction and this court affirmed.
McNair filed a §2255 in 2005 (denied and told to seek state relief); a 2007 state coram nobis attempt failed.
In early 2017 a state judge vacated the 1992 conviction; McNair returned to federal court seeking resentencing, but the district court dismissed his filing as an unauthorized successive collateral attack.
The Seventh Circuit held that Panetti (and related precedent) permits a new §2255 motion based on a state-court vacatur that made the claim unripe earlier, aligning with other circuits, but affirmed dismissal because McNair’s §2255 was time-barred under §2255(f)(4) (Johnson requires prompt action from the date of judgment) given his ~14-year delay.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a state-court vacatur that postdates federal sentencing permits an initial §2255 motion challenging the enhanced sentence	Panetti allows a new §2255 when the claim was unripe until the state vacatur; McNair may file an initial collateral attack after vacatur	Such claims are successive/unauthorized under §§2244/2255(h); Unthank/Purvis bar new filings	Panetti governs; a §2255 motion is the proper vehicle when the vacatur makes the claim ripe
Whether Unthank and Purvis preclude Panetti-based §2255 motions	Unthank/Purvis are distinguishable and do not prevent Panetti claims	Those decisions suggest successive-motion limits apply	Unthank and Purvis do not conflict with Panetti and do not bar such §2255 motions
Whether McNair’s §2255 was timely under §2255(f)(4) given the state vacatur	McNair contends claim was unripe earlier so limitations should run from the vacatur	Limitations run from the date of judgment; Johnson requires prompt diligence after judgment	Motion was time-barred: Johnson’s diligence rule starts at judgment (2003); McNair’s ~14-year delay is not diligent
Whether McNair is entitled to resentencing	Vacatur entitles him to resentencing	Untimely §2255 bars relief	No resentencing; appeal affirmed on timeliness grounds

Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (federal courts generally may not collaterally attack a prior state conviction used to enhance a federal sentence at sentencing)
Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (statutory one-year diligence rule for §2255(f)(4); diligence measured from date of judgment)
Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (claims unripe until later factual developments may permit a new collateral attack)
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (distinguishes types of successive petitions and ripeness issues)
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (stay-and-abeyance for mixed habeas petitions)
Unthank v. Je;, 549 F.3d 534 (7th Cir. 2008) (addressed §2241 use and held §2255 is the proper vehicle for sentence challenges based on record changes)
Purvis v. United States, 662 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2011) (reversed dismissal of premature §2255 and endorsed staying federal proceedings while state collateral proceedings are pending)
United States v. Obeid, 707 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2013) (discussed Panetti and held §2255 is appropriate for new factual developments but denied relief for delay)
Godoski v. United States, 304 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2002) (ignorance of law does not excuse §2255 time limits)
United States v. Hairston, 754 F.3d 258 (4th Cir. 2014) (permitting §2255 after state vacatur)
In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2013) (same)
Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 2011) (same)
Boyd v. United States, 754 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2014) (same)