Tyrell v. Graham, 9:11-cv-01371

Petitioner Gary Tyrell, pro se, challenged a 2009 Albany County Court conviction for second degree attempted murder, first degree assault, two counts of first degree robbery, second degree robbery, and second degree criminal possession of a weapon.
The jury trial included identification by the victim, corroboration from ballistics, cell records, and a jailhouse informant; Rose was co-defendant and separately tried and convicted on related charges.
Tyrell argued suppression was improperly denied, the evidence was legally insufficient, gang-membership evidence was improperly admitted, and a juror was improperly discharged.
Appellate Division affirmed the conviction; New York Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal; Tyrell sought de novo relief, coram nobis, or reargument, which the Appellate Division denied.
Petition was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; AEDPA standard applies, requiring a showing of unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or unreasonable factual determinations.
The court denied the petition, held Tyrell's Fourth Amendment claim procedurally barred and merits-based issues unpersuasive, and declined to grant a COA.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence	Tyrell asserts insufficiency; victim Brown testified he shot him after not paying a drug debt.	Graham contends evidence viewed in the light most favorable supports all elements beyond a reasonable doubt.	Petition denied; evidence sufficient to sustain convictions; no due process failures.
Admission of gang-member evidence (Molineux)	Tyrell contends admission of gang evidence violated due process through propensity inference.	Graham contends state court properly admitted and weighed probative value against prejudice.	Ground Two unexhausted and procedurally defaulted; alternatively, evidentiary ruling not a due process violation.
Juror discharge	Tyrell argues the discharge violated CPL procedures and fairness.	Graham asserts proper discretion and record-supported decision under CPL §270.35.	Ground Three exhausted only on state-law grounds; procedurally defaulted as federal claim; even if reached, no due process violation.
Fourth Amendment claim	Tyrell claims the state courts unreasonably applied Fourth Amendment precedent in denying suppression.	Graham argues Stone v. Powell bars habeas relief where corrective state procedures were available and utilized.	Petition denied; Fourth Amendment claim barred by Stone v. Powell; no unconscionable breakdown in corrective process.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (U.S. 1976) (habeas review limited when state provides full and fair suppression procedures)
Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225 (U.S. 2001) (due process sufficiency standard for conviction review)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (sufficiency of evidence standard on direct appeal)
Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148 (S. Ct. 2012) (reaffirmed rational juror standard in sufficiency analysis)
Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78 (2d Cir. 2001) (exhaustion requirements for federal habeas petitions)
Carvajal v. Artuz, 633 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2011) (fair presentation of federal claims for exhaustion)
Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1992) (state evidentiary errors and the scope of habeas review)
Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (Stone v. Powell effect on federal review of state court decisions)
Clark v. Perez, 510 F.3d 382 (2d Cir. 2008) (exhaustion and procedural default principles in habeas)
Daye v. Atty. Gen. of N.Y., 696 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1982) (test for fair presentation of federal claims to state courts)