Tyler v. Michaels Stores, Inc.
840 F. Supp. 2d 438
D. Mass.2012Background
- Tyler sues Michaels for violation of Massachusetts Gen. Laws ch. 93, § 105(a) alleging ZIP codes were improperly written on transaction forms.
- Complaint also asserts a per se violation of ch. 93A § 9, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief.
- Michaels moves to dismiss, contending no 105(a) violation, no cognizable injury, and failure to state unjust enrichment or declaratory relief claims.
- Facts: Tyler’s ZIP code was requested/entered at point-of-sale; ZIP code allegedly used with other data to locate full address and send marketing materials.
- Court must interpret § 105(a): whether ZIP code is personal identification information and whether an electronic transaction form falls within ‘credit card transaction form.’
- Jurisdiction exists under § 1332(d) with minimal diversity, over 100 potential class members, and >$5 million in controversy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is ZIP code personal identification information under § 105(a)? | ZIP code is part of address; broad reading aligns with Pineda. | ZIP code is not personal identification information under § 105(a). | ZIP code qualifies as personal identification information under § 105(a). |
| Does a retailer's electronic card terminal constitute a credit card transaction form? | Transaction form includes electronic records storing ZIP codes. | Only paper receipts constitute transaction forms; electronic forms are not. | Electronic transaction forms fall within the statute’s scope. |
| Has Tyler sufficiently alleged a § 105(a) violation? | ZIP code entered despite issuer not requiring it. | Recordation may be permissible or not clearly a violation. | Tyler sufficiently pleaded a violation of § 105(a). |
| Does § 105(a) violation support cognizable injury under Chapter 93A? | Violation creates per se injury to privacy/identity; damages aren’t required. | Violation alone does not establish injury; need actual damages or cognizable injury. | Tyler fails to show cognizable injury under 93A with the § 105(a) violation alone. |
| Does Tyler have standing to pursue declaratory relief or unjust enrichment? | Private right of action under § 105(a) suffices for standing. | Standing requires an injury; without injury, no declaratory relief or unjust enrichment. | No standing for declaratory relief or unjust enrichment; claims dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc., 51 Cal.4th 524 (Cal. 2011) (ZIP code constitutes personal identification information)
- Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 266, § 37E(a), — (Mass.) (statutory definition referenced for personal identifying information)
- Leardi v. Brown, 394 Mass. 151 (Mass. 1985) (injury theory in contract/lease contexts applicable to 93A analysis)
- Aspinall v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 442 Mass. 381 (Mass. 2004) (deceptive advertising can support cognizable 93A injury)
- Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623 (Mass. 2008) (defective product risk can constitute cognizable injury)
- Hershenow v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Bos., Inc., 445 Mass. 790 (Mass. 2006) (injury required for 93A when deception occurs; risk alone not enough)
- In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F.Supp.2d 705 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (standing requires concrete injury for privacy-related claims)
- Conservation Law Found. of New England, Inc. v. Reilly, 950 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1991) (statutory violation alone may not establish standing)