936 F.3d 453
6th Cir.2019Background
- Early morning 2015: dispatch alerted deputies to an alleged drunk driver; license plate check erroneously showed the vehicle as stolen and tied to a suspect, Brandon Powell, reported "armed and dangerous."
- Deputies located the vehicle and its owner, Ty Shanaberg, standing outside; deputies ordered him to get on the ground.
- Shanaberg dropped to his knees and raised his hands but repeatedly refused commands to lie prone despite nine exchanges and three warnings that a taser would be used.
- Deputy Brian Stetson tased Shanaberg, who fell and was handcuffed; officers later discovered the vehicle had been mistakenly listed as stolen.
- Shanaberg sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Stetson, two other deputies, Licking County, and others; district court granted summary judgment for defendants (qualified immunity for Stetson; other grounds for others), and Shanaberg appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force / qualified immunity (Stetson) | Tasing was unreasonable because Shanaberg had surrendered (on knees, hands up) and did not pose a threat. | Stetson reasonably feared an armed, intoxicated suspect who was verbally belligerent and refused to lie down; tasing was objectively reasonable. | Qualified immunity granted: use of force was objectively reasonable given reported armed-dangerous risk, verbal belligerence, and refusal to assume a less-threatening position. |
| Failure-to-intervene (other deputies) | Other deputies failed to stop the tasing. | Claim not pled properly; and no viable claim because tasing was justified. | Rejected: not pleaded and, in any event, no underlying constitutional violation to intervene against. |
| Monell claim (Licking County policy) | County policy caused unconstitutional use of force. | No municipal liability because no constitutional violation occurred. | Dismissed: no direct causal link because Stetson’s use of force was reasonable, so Monell liability fails. |
| Clearly established law on verbal noncompliance justification | Existing precedent shows tasing submissive suspects is unreasonable; therefore Stetson should not be entitled to qualified immunity. | Even if borderline, law was not clearly established about what level of "verbal belligerence" justifies a taser. | Majority: decided on reasonableness (no violation). Concurring judge: would grant qualified immunity because law unclear about level of verbal noncompliance that permits tasing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (qualified-immunity two-step framework)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (objective-reasonableness test for excessive force)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (use-of-force analysis under totality of circumstances)
- Kent v. Oakland County, 810 F.3d 384 (6th Cir. 2016) (denial of qualified immunity when tasing a submissive suspect in a home under facts)
- Bletz v. Gribble, 641 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2011) (examining totality of circumstances in force cases)
- Correa v. Simone, [citation="528 F. App'x 531"] (6th Cir. 2013) (denying qualified immunity where suspect allegedly had gun but appeared nonthreatening)
- Thomas v. Plummer, [citation="489 F. App'x 116"] (6th Cir. 2012) (denying qualified immunity where suspect was on knees with hands raised and tased)
- Eldridge v. City of Warren, [citation="533 F. App'x 529"] (6th Cir. 2013) (verbal hostility combined with noncompliance can constitute active resistance)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy or custom that is moving force behind constitutional violation)