Turner v. CertainTeed Corp. (Slip Opinion)
119 N.E.3d 1260
Ohio2018Background
- Bobby Turner sued CertainTeed/Union Carbide alleging his 2013 lung cancer was caused by asbestos exposure from work in 1962–1978.
- Turner did not submit the prima facie medical evidence required by R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) for plaintiffs who are "smokers" within 30 days of filing; he asserted he was a nonsmoker and provided some medical records and affidavits.
- Union Carbide moved for administrative dismissal, later renewed, contending discovery and a pulmonologist’s affidavit showed Turner met the statutory "one-pack year" threshold in the prior 15 years and thus is a "smoker" who must file the statutory prima facie reports.
- The trial court denied dismissal, finding Union Carbide had not proven Turner is a "smoker." The court of appeals affirmed, treating smoking-status as a factual question for the factfinder and holding a medical report is required only after a person has been designated a "smoker."
- The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the court of appeals and remanded for the trial court to determine whether Union Carbide submitted a qualifying "written report of a competent medical authority" specifying Turner had smoked the equivalent of one-pack year during the last 15 years under R.C. 2307.91(DD).
- The lead opinion interprets the statutory scheme (R.C. 2307.91–.93) to mean a defendant can put R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) at issue by submitting such a medical report, triggering the court’s summary-judgment–style review and possible administrative dismissal if the plaintiff (now shown to be a smoker) has not met the prima facie requirements.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Turner) | Defendant's Argument (Union Carbide) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| How is "smoker" status determined under R.C. 2307.91(DD)? | Smoking status is a factual question for the factfinder; "pack-year" reference does not limit to cigarettes; Turner contends he is a nonsmoker and medical notes showing smoking are mistaken | Smoking status is established when a written report of a competent medical authority specifies the person smoked the equivalent of one-pack year in the last 15 years; defendant may submit such a report to require the plaintiff to meet R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) prima facie evidence | Court: "Smoker" is defined by statute as someone so specified in a written report of a competent medical authority; defendant may put R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) at issue by submitting such a report and the trial court must follow R.C. 2307.93 procedures to decide whether plaintiff is a smoker and whether dismissal is required. |
| Does "pack year" in R.C. 2307.91(DD) apply only to cigarette smoking? | "Pack year" should be read as cigarette-specific, excluding cigar-only history | Statute’s plain text does not limit to types of smoking; threshold measures consumption, not vehicle | Court: "pack year" concept is not limited to cigarettes by the statute; R.C. 2307.91(DD) applies to smoking tobacco generally. |
| Who must prove smoking or nonsmoking status and by what evidence? | Plaintiff need not prove nonsmoking by a medical report; smoking is a factual issue | Defendant may force plaintiff to meet R.C. 2307.92(C)(1) by submitting a qualifying written medical report showing plaintiff is a smoker | Court: A person is a "smoker" only if a competent medical authority specifies so in a written report. The plaintiff is not required to prove nonsmoking in advance, but the defendant can trigger the statutory process by submitting such a report; trial court must determine whether the defendant did so. |
| What is the proper procedural effect if a plaintiff is shown to be a smoker but did not submit prima facie evidence? | (Turner) Trial court erred in dismissing; smoking status factual for jury | (Union Carbide) If smoker and prima facie not shown, court must administratively dismiss under R.C. 2307.93(C) (retain jurisdiction) | Court: If the defendant’s submission establishes the plaintiff is a smoker and plaintiff has not met R.C. 2307.92(C)(1), the court must administratively dismiss without prejudice (per R.C. 2307.93(C)); remand to determine whether defendant submitted a qualifying report. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ceccarelli v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 231 (2010) (statutory interpretation standard is de novo)
- Renfrow v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 140 Ohio St.3d 371 (2014) (definition and requirements for "competent medical authority")
- Symmes Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Smyth, 87 Ohio St.3d 549 (1999) (apply unambiguous statute as written)
- Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312 (1944) (plain statutory language applied, not interpreted)
- State v. Ladd, 56 Ohio St.2d 197 (1978) (interpretation of term "a" meaning "any")