Turner, David v. Pee Dee Country Enterprises, Inc.
2021 TN WC App. 68
| Tenn. Work. Comp. App. Bd. | 2021Background
- Employee David Joe Turner died in a work-related vehicle accident; Employer Pee Dee Country Enterprises (TN) initially paid death benefits under Mississippi law to the surviving spouse, Jamie Henderson (MS residence).
- Henderson retained counsel and pursued Tennessee benefits, which yielded a greater recovery; counsel and Henderson contracted for 20% of the difference between the Tennessee award and the Mississippi award (20% of $232,285.50 = $46,457.10).
- The parties resolved the underlying death-benefits claim without trial, but disputed approval, amount, and lump-sum payment of the attorney’s fee.
- The trial court required supplemental time documentation, then approved a lump-sum fee equal to 7.5% of the increased benefit (about $17,421.41) instead of the contracted 20%.
- On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board first vacated and remanded for statutory analysis; after the trial court again awarded 7.5%, the Appeals Board reversed, holding the second sentence of Tenn. Code §50-6-226(a)(1) applies and directing approval of the agreed fee; Judge Hensley dissented.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the second sentence of Tenn. Code Ann. §50-6-226(a)(1) applies to judges of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims (i.e., whether “the department” must "deem" certain fees reasonable) | Henderson: the statutory sentence applies; the department (including the Court) must deem fees reasonable if ≤20% of the award | Pee Dee: the provision does not apply to this case or to judges of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims | Held: The sentence applies; "the department" includes the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims and limits judges’ discretion to refuse approval when fee ≤20% of the award (or 20% of first 450 weeks where applicable). |
| Whether the trial court erred in reducing/denying approval of the contracted contingency fee and refusing lump-sum approval | Henderson: trial court must approve the contracted 20% of the increased benefit and may commute to lump sum under §50-6-229(a) | Pee Dee: the requested fee and lump-sum payment are excessive; court may review reasonableness and reduce fee | Held: Trial court erred; reversed and remanded for entry of an order approving the attorney’s fee agreed to by Henderson and counsel (trial court retains discretion only as to commutation to lump sum under §50-6-229(a)). |
Key Cases Cited
- Coleman v. Olson, 551 S.W.3d 686 (Tenn. 2018) (statutory interpretation principles)
- In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610 (Tenn. 2009) (presumption every word in statute has meaning)
- Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393 (Tenn. 2013) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- Young v. Frist Cardiology, 599 S.W.3d 568 (Tenn. 2020) (avoid constructions rendering statutes superfluous)
- Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166 (Tenn. 2011) (use of Rule 8 factors in fee reasonableness analysis)
- Perdue v. Green Branch Mining Co., 837 S.W.2d 56 (Tenn. 1992) (20% statutory ceiling is a maximum, may be unreasonable depending on circumstances)