2014 Ohio 930
Ohio Ct. App.2014Background
- Tuleta was indicted (2003–2007 conduct) on multiple drug-possession counts and aggravated theft; convicted at trial and sentenced, then appealed. The appellate court vacated his convictions because prescribed medications fell within the statutory exception to possession.
- After vacatur, Tuleta sued Cuyahoga County, the Prosecutor’s Office, former prosecutor William Mason, assistant prosecutors James Gutierrez and Mary McGrath, the City of Cleveland, the Police Chief, Medical Mutual of Ohio, and an investigator, alleging malicious prosecution, abuse of process, breach/inducing breach of confidentiality, intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium.
- Defendants (county/prosecutors/city/police chief) moved to dismiss asserting absolute and statutory immunity.
- The trial court granted dismissal as to Cuyahoga County, the Prosecutor’s Office, Mason, Gutierrez, and McGrath based on absolute immunity; granted the City’s motion on statutory immunity; denied the Police Chief’s motion (later reversed in a companion appeal).
- On appeal, the court considered whether the prosecutor-defendants were entitled to absolute and statutory immunity for Tuleta’s claims arising from initiation and prosecution of the underlying case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutors Mason, Gutierrez, and McGrath are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for Tuleta’s claims | Tuleta asserted prosecutors acted improperly such that absolute immunity should not apply to his malicious prosecution, abuse of process, confidentiality-breach, and related tort claims | Prosecutors argued their challenged conduct was prosecutorial advocacy (charging, presenting to grand jury, preparing/presenting evidence), entitling them to absolute immunity | The court held the complaint alleges only prosecutorial/advocacy acts; absolute immunity applies and bars the claims |
| Whether R.C. 2744.03(A)(7) (statutory immunity) shields the prosecutor-defendants | Tuleta contended statutory immunity did not bar his claims against individual prosecutors | Defendants relied on R.C. 2744.03(A)(7) preserving common-law defenses, including absolute immunity for prosecutors | The court held statutory immunity preserves common-law absolute immunity; dismissal on statutory-immunity grounds was proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (establishes limited absolute immunity for certain executive officials)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (prosecutors entitled to absolute immunity for advocacy functions in initiating and pursuing prosecution)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (discusses immunity and alternatives to suit for official misconduct)
- Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (extends absolute immunity to certain administrative adjudicators)
- Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (focus on function performed, not identity, in immunity analysis)
- Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (reaffirms prosecutorial immunity for certain supervisory prosecutorial functions)
- Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (absolute immunity for prosecutors in probable-cause hearings and warrant-supporting activities)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (distinguishes pre-prosecution investigative acts and public statements not deserving absolute immunity)
- Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118 (prosecutorial certifications that function as a complaining witness are not absolutely immune)
- Shmueli v. New York, 424 F.3d 231 (absolute immunity applies where relevant law arguably supports prosecutor’s claims regardless of motive)