73 F. Supp. 3d 1311
W.D. Wash.2014Background
- Class action by pretrial criminal defendants found or suspected incompetent, seeking timely court-ordered competency evaluation and restoration services provided by Washington State hospitals (WSH, ESH) and DSHS.
- State law assigns WSH and ESH responsibility for evaluations/restoration; legislature set a seven-day target for transfers but hospitals lack beds, staff, and secure space.
- Plaintiffs routinely wait in county jails for transfers; average waits reported up to ~50 days at ESH for evaluation and multiple weeks elsewhere; legislative seven-day target met <15% of time.
- Jail conditions frequently worsen mental illness (poor medication continuity, solitary confinement, self-harm, assault), undermining restoration and ability to stand trial.
- Defendants concede some wait times are "excessive and indefensible," but cite staffing, safety, facility limitations, and argue some delay is reasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Do current in-jail wait times for court-ordered competency evaluation and restoration violate substantive due process? | Extended waits in jails deny liberty and restorative treatment; wait times cause harm and are unconstitutional. | Some delay is reasonable given limited beds/staff and safety/facility concerns; lack of a bright-line rule. | Yes. Current waits (weeks to months) violate substantive due process. |
| Do the detainees have constitutionally protected liberty interests in freedom from incarceration and restorative treatment? | Yes — pretrial incapacitated defendants have a liberty interest in freedom from incarceration and timely restorative treatment. | Concedes detainees have due process rights but disputes what waits are reasonable. | Yes. Recognized and weighed in balancing. |
| Can the State justify delays based on lack of funds, staff, or facilities? | No — lack of resources does not justify constitutional deprivation of liberty or required treatment. | Resource and safety constraints justify some reasonable delays. | No. Resource shortfalls do not excuse unconstitutional prolonged detention; state interest does not support long delays. |
| Should the court adopt a seven-day bright-line constitutional rule for transfer? | Plaintiffs urge that >7 days violates due process. | Opposes any bright-line; argues arbitrary numbers are improper and factual adjudication at trial is needed. | Court finds <7 days comport with due process and >7 days is "suspect," but declines to adopt a constitutional bright line now and reserves precise outer boundary for trial. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lopez-Valenzuela v. Arpaio, 770 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2014) (discusses substantive due process protection of fundamental liberty interests)
- Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (framework for fundamental liberty interests under substantive due process)
- Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (substantive due process analysis principles)
- Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003) (incapacitated criminal defendants' liberty interests and balancing test)
- Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (limits on commitment of criminal defendants incompetent to stand trial)
- Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1980) (constitutional requirement of adequate individual treatment for restoration)
- Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (state's interest in bringing accused to trial as a fundamental governmental objective)