Troy Shaw v. State of Indiana, 82 N.E.3d 886

Background

In June 2000 Shaw was charged with Class B aggravated battery after a motel fight in which Brett King later died; omnibus date was set for July 31, 2000.
On November 30, 2001 (≈17 months after omnibus), the State moved to amend the information to charge Shaw with murder based on the same factual events; Shaw objected and received a continuance.
At a February 2002 jury trial eyewitnesses and an autopsy tied multiple blows and kicks to King’s death; the jury convicted Shaw of murder and he was sentenced to 60 years.
Shaw’s first direct appeal (2003) raised only sufficiency of the evidence and was affirmed; Shaw later litigated ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in state and federal courts.
The Seventh Circuit held in 2013 that Shaw’s appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the late substantive amendment under Indiana Code § 35-34-1-5 and ordered that Shaw be given a new direct appeal unless the State granted one.
On remand the Indiana Court of Appeals (this opinion) reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the amendment 17 months after omnibus and affirmed, concluding no prejudice to Shaw’s substantial rights under controlling pre-Fajardo state precedent.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court erred in allowing State to amend information from aggravated battery to murder 17 months after omnibus	Amendment was substantive and untimely under I.C. § 35-34-1-5 (only up to 30 days before omnibus); relief required	Even if substantive, precedent at the time allowed post-omnibus substantive amendments so long as defendant’s substantial rights were not prejudiced; Shaw had notice, a hearing, and a continuance	Affirmed — no error: Shaw received notice, opportunity to be heard, and additional time; no demonstrated prejudice to substantial rights
Whether this appeal should be dismissed as an improper collateral attack (res judicata / jurisdiction)	Court of Appeals lacked power to create a new appeal; res judicata/estoppel bars re-litigation	Seventh Circuit issued federal relief ordering a new direct appeal; state courts must comply or seek federal relief	Denied — state court must follow the Seventh Circuit’s remedial option; collateral attack arguments rejected
Whether Shaw was denied funds to investigate juror deliberations (transcript/investigator)	Needed funds to reconstruct record of jury question during deliberations	Juror impeachment is generally prohibited; proposed investigation sought to impeach verdict and is improper under Indiana law	Denied — request would impermissibly attempt to impeach jury deliberations; no funding error
Whether Court of Appeals improperly failed to rule on Shaw’s defective filings (motions for alternative relief / relief from rules)	Motions were not considered and thus Shaw had no meaningful opportunity to be heard	Motions were defective (exceeded page limits, lacked word count); clerk notified Shaw and motions were not officially filed	Denied — motions were not properly filed so appellate court had nothing to rule on

Key Cases Cited

Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2013) (federal habeas holding appellate counsel ineffective for failing to raise timeliness challenge to amended information)
Haak v. State, 695 N.E.2d 944 (Ind. 1998) (discussed limits on untimely amendments; interpreted by Seventh Circuit as restricting substantive amendments after statutory cut-off)
Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201 (Ind. 2007) (held substantive amendments are permissible only up to 30 days before omnibus; later superseded by legislative amendment)
Prewitt v. State, 761 N.E.2d 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (post-omnibus substantive amendment allowed where facts same, defendant had notice, hearing, and time to prepare; no prejudice shown)
Tripp v. State, 729 N.E.2d 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (substantive amendment not per se barred post-omnibus if substantial rights — notice, hearing, continuance — are preserved)
Townsend v. State, 753 N.E.2d 88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (explains that Haak should not be read to render statutory continuance provision superfluous)