Trowell v. Providence Hospital and Medical Centers, Inc
316 Mich. App. 680
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- On Feb 11, 2014, Audrey Trowell sued Providence Hospital after a patient‑care technician allegedly dropped her twice while assisting her to the ICU bathroom on Feb 11, 2011.
- Trowell alleged injuries including a torn rotator cuff and intracranial bleeding and pleaded causes titled "Medical Negligence" (later proposed amendment titled "Negligence").
- She did not serve a medical‑malpractice notice of intent or file an affidavit of merit, and the suit was filed after the two‑year malpractice limitations period.
- The hospital moved for summary disposition arguing the complaint sounded in medical malpractice (triggering the malpractice notice/affidavit and two‑year statute of limitations).
- The trial court granted summary disposition and denied motions to reconsider and to amend; the Court of Appeals reviewed only the complaint allegations (no documentary evidence submitted).
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the complaint’s allegations did not establish as a matter of law that the claims necessarily sounded in medical malpractice and remanded for further fact development.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the complaint sounds in medical malpractice or ordinary negligence | Trowell: falls/drops by an aide are ordinary negligence; no medical expertise needed | Providence: professional relationship exists and issues (staffing, monitoring, transfer techniques) require medical judgment | Court: Cannot decide from complaint alone; allegations could support either; dismissal was error — remand for fact development |
| Whether using one aide (vs two) implicates medical judgment | Trowell: a lay jury can assess unreasonableness of using one aide | Providence: determining how many caregivers are needed requires medical/nursing judgment | Court: May implicate medical judgment in some cases but also may be resolved by lay knowledge depending on facts; complaint insufficient to decide |
| Whether the manner of physically handling the patient (the "drops") requires expert proof | Trowell: gratuitous/obvious mishandling (e.g., dropping due to inattentiveness) is within common knowledge | Providence: techniques for transferring/holding patients involve professional judgment | Court: Could be either; a plainly unreasonable act could be for lay jurors, but complaint alone cannot show which applies |
| Whether the second "dropping" and failure to take corrective steps sound in malpractice | Trowell: failure to take corrective action after first drop is ordinary negligence | Providence: overall care/monitoring decisions still involve medical judgment | Held: Under Bryant, failure to take corrective action after knowing a hazard can be ordinary negligence; second drop may be distinguishable from first and could be for lay jurors |
| Whether the trial court erred denying leave to amend | Trowell: proposed amended complaint alleged ordinary negligence | Providence: amendment would be futile because claims still sound in malpractice | Court: Did not decide amendment issue on merits because remand required; noted proposed amendment largely mirrored original and likely would have been futile if case had failed |
Key Cases Cited
- Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr., 471 Mich 411 (medical‑malpractice v. ordinary negligence test; two elements: professional relationship and medical judgment)
- Cox v. Flint Bd. of Hosp. Managers, 467 Mich 1 (hospital liability: direct supervision/selection and vicarious liability)
- Wiley v. Henry Ford Cottage Hosp., 257 Mich App 488 (patient transfer injuries often require nursing expertise; treated as malpractice)
- Sturgis Bank & Trust Co. v. Hillsdale Cmty. Health Ctr., 268 Mich App 484 (fall risk and use of safety measures can implicate medical judgment)
- Zsigo v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 475 Mich 215 (employer direct liability for hiring/training/supervision)
- Moning v. Alfono, 400 Mich 425 (general negligence standard and proof of breach)
- Woodard v. Custer, 473 Mich 1 (res ipsa loquitur standard in medical context)