Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer
137 S. Ct. 2012
| SCOTUS | 2017Background
- Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center (a church-run preschool/daycare in Missouri) applied to Missouri’s Scrap Tire Program for a grant to resurface its playground with recycled-rubber material.
- The Department of Natural Resources had a policy categorically disqualifying applicants "owned or controlled by a church," citing Article I, §7 of the Missouri Constitution forbidding public aid to churches.
- Trinity Lutheran scored 5th of 44 applicants but was denied solely because it is a church; 14 secular applicants received grants.
- Trinity Lutheran sued under the Free Exercise Clause seeking to participate in the generally available grant program without disavowing its religious character; lower courts dismissed/affirmed, relying on Locke v. Davey and state anti-establishment concerns.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the Department’s categorical exclusion of churches from an otherwise neutral, secular public-benefit program violated the Free Exercise Clause; the policy failed strict scrutiny.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether excluding churches from generally available public benefits solely because of religious status violates the Free Exercise Clause | Trinity: categorical exclusion penalizes religious status and bars church from competing for a neutral public benefit | Department: withholding a discretionary subsidy does not meaningfully burden free exercise; state may avoid establishment by excluding churches | Held: exclusion imposes a penalty on free exercise and triggers strict scrutiny; unconstitutional here |
| Whether Locke v. Davey controls and permits denying funding here | Trinity: Locke is distinguishable—Davey was denied for what he proposed to do (devotional theology), not for who he is | Department: Locke supports refusing funds to religious actors to avoid establishment concerns | Held: Locke not controlling; here denial was based on identity (a church), not on the use of funds for religious training |
| Whether Missouri’s anti-establishment interest justifies the categorical exclusion (compelling-interest / strict-scrutiny question) | Trinity: interest in avoiding establishment is insufficient to justify discriminating against religious status; not compelling here | Department: strong historic/state interest in preventing public aid to churches under state constitution justifies the policy | Held: Missouri’s asserted interest (avoiding establishment) is not sufficiently compelling to survive strict scrutiny for this program |
| Whether the Establishment Clause prevents inclusion of churches in the Scrap Tire Program | Trinity: federal Establishment Clause does not prohibit including churches in neutral, secular grant programs | Department: providing direct funds to churches risks violating establishment principles (and state constitutional provision) | Held: Parties agreed federal Establishment Clause does not bar including Trinity; Court proceeds under Free Exercise analysis and does not hold that federal Establishment Clause prohibits the grant |
Key Cases Cited
- Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (government cannot exclude beneficiaries from public welfare based on religion; establishes interplay of Establishment and Free Exercise)
- McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (statute disqualifying ministers from public office penalizes religious status; strict scrutiny for laws imposing special disabilities on religion)
- Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upheld denial of scholarships for devotional theology; distinguishes denial for religious use vs. identity)
- Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (laws that target religion for disfavored treatment trigger strict scrutiny)
- Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (conditioning benefits in a way that deters religious exercise implicates Free Exercise scrutiny)
- Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (recognizes compelling-interest test in Free Exercise context)
- Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (neutral, generally applicable laws differ from laws that single out religion)
- Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012) (recognizes special considerations for church autonomy and ministerial exception)
- Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (Free Exercise protects against excluding religious groups from generally available benefits)
- Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (addresses limits and safeguards when public funds reach religious schools)
- Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (framework for assessing whether government aid impermissibly advances religion)