961 F.3d 1135
11th Cir.2020Background
- On Sept. 28, 2015, King (on TASC probation) was stopped for a car with no tag; passenger Donavan Brown gave false information and fled; King was handcuffed in an officer’s SUV.
- Officers searched for Brown in a residential area; King volunteered Brown’s name and number and said Brown had a gun.
- After officers threatened to “throw some charges” on King and said “if you fk us over, we’ll fk you over,” they induced King (reluctantly, King says under fear) to call Brown and pick him up as part of a ruse to apprehend Brown.
- When King picked up Brown and police attempted to stop the car, Brown shot at officers; police returned fire, Brown was shot 13 times, King was shot multiple times.
- King sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Thirteenth Amendment involuntary servitude and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process) and brought Alabama tort claims. The district court granted summary judgment to officers (qualified immunity and state-agent immunity); the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers coerced King into involuntary servitude (Thirteenth Amendment) | King: officers’ threats forced him to perform work (call/pick up Brown), i.e., involuntary servitude | Officers: statements were law-enforcement enticement/warning about lawful charges; no threat of physical force or false charges | No constitutional violation found on the record; even assuming a violation, law was not clearly established |
| Whether officers’ conduct violated substantive due process (Fourteenth Amendment) | King: coercion and threats of violence/false charges shocked the conscience | Officers: conduct was discretionary policing tactics in pursuit of an armed fugitive; no conscience-shocking behavior | No substantive due process violation proved; high threshold not met |
| Whether officers are entitled to qualified immunity on federal claims | King: rights were violated and clearly established | Officers: objectively reasonable belief their tactics were lawful; no controlling precedent made conduct ‘obviously’ unlawful | Qualified immunity affirmed — no clearly established law put officers on notice |
| Whether officers have Alabama state-agent (discretionary-function) immunity for state tort claims | King: officers acted willfully, maliciously, or beyond authority | Officers: actions were discretionary law-enforcement functions; Cranman/Hollis framework shields them | State-agent immunity affirmed for same reasons as qualified immunity |
Key Cases Cited
- Bailey v. State of Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (definition and scope of involuntary servitude under Thirteenth Amendment)
- United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (coercion through legal process as involuntary servitude)
- United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281 (involuntary servitude can be of slight duration)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (substantive due process "shocks the conscience" standard)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (qualified immunity — do not define clearly established law at high level of generality)
- White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (reiterating need for particularized clearly established law in qualified immunity analysis)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (qualified immunity objective-reasonableness standard)
- Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919 (qualified immunity standard in Eleventh Circuit)