Trevardo Dermont Dixon v. U.S. Attorney General, 768 F.3d 1339

Dixon petitions for review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an IJ order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
Aggravated felony definition requires a crime of violence as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16 with a sentence of at least one year.
Dixon challenges Florida's aggravated fleeing statute, Fla. Stat. § 316.1935(4)(a), arguing the five-year sentence arose from a probation violation, not the original offense.
Florida law treats probation revocation as deferred sentencing for the underlying offense, potentially satisfying the one-year term requirement only if the underlying offense yields such a term.
At the revocation hearing, Dixon pled guilty to the underlying offenses, including aggravated fleeing, and the court adjudicated him guilty, aligning with Florida's treatment of revocation as imposing sentence for the original offense.
The court concludes the probation revocation produced a prison term of at least one year, satisfying § 1101(a)(43)(F); it also analyzes whether aggravated fleeing qualifies as a crime of violence under § 16(b).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the five-year term counts as Dixon's sentence for aggravated fleeing	Dixon argues revocation yields a sentence for the probation violation, not the underlying crime.	The Florida revocation procedure imposes sentence for the underlying offense, not solely the probation violation.	Yes; the sentence count meets the one-year threshold.
Whether aggravated fleeing is a crime of violence under § 16(b)	Aggravated fleeing does not necessarily involve a substantial risk of using physical force.	Fleeing from police indicates a substantial risk that physical force may be used; it is inherently violent.	Yes; aggravated fleeing involves a substantial risk of force and falls within § 16(b).

Accardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 634 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2011) (legal standard for deciding if a conviction is an aggravated felony)
Cole v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 712 F.3d 517 (11th Cir. 2013) (review of BIA/ IJ decisions on crime of violence; categorical approach)
Ayala v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 941 (11th Cir. 2010) (establishes review framework for immigration decisions)
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court 2004) (limits § 16(a) to active use of force; informs § 16(b) interpretation)
Palomino Garcia v. United States, 606 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2010) (informs interpretation of § 16(b) and 'use of physical force' concept)
Sanchez-Ledezma v. United States, 630 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 2011) (discusses risk and use of force in fleeing contexts)
McGuire v. United States, 706 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2013) (aircraft damage/disablement as § 16(b) crime of violence context)
Johnson v. United States, 399 F.3d 1297 (11th Cir. 2005) (felon in possession of firearm; § 16(b) considerations)
Peters v. State, 984 So.2d 1227 (Fla. 2008) (probation revocation treated as deferred sentencing for underlying offense)