Trent Lindig v. Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club
03-15-00051-CV
| Tex. App. | May 26, 2015Background
- 1927 deed from Albert Lindig conveyed land "for school purposes" to Pleasant Hill School District No. 21 and included a reverter clause returning the land to Lindig’s heirs if the schoolhouse (or any house built and used for a schoolhouse) was removed from the land.
- It is undisputed the property ceased to be used for school purposes in 1952 and no school has operated there since.
- The original school building (or a building that once housed the school) reportedly remains on the property.
- Appellant Trent Lindig filed a Rule 248 motion and appeals the trial court’s order that the reverter clause had not been triggered; he asks the court to declare title in him.
- Appellant’s brief argues the deed must be read as a whole under Texas construction rules and that the reverter was tied to the cessation of school use, not merely physical removal of a building.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lindig) | Defendant's Argument (Pleasant Hill Rocky Community Club) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the reverter in the 1927 deed is triggered when the property ceases to be used as a school | The deed’s four‑corners must be read; multiple clauses tie the limitation to use for "school purposes," so when no school operated after 1952 the reverter vested in Lindig’s heirs | Reverter triggered only if the (school) building is removed from the property; mere cessation of school operations is insufficient | Appellant argues reverter is use‑based and therefore vested when the property stopped being used for school purposes (court reversal requested) |
| Proper rule of construction for conditional limitations/reverters | Courts must harmonize all parts of the deed and give effect to all words; the modifier "school" attaches to "house" so the focus is use, not presence | The plain text of the reverter refers to removal of the schoolhouse, so literal reading favors the Club | Appellant relies on Luckel and related rules to show the deed must be construed to effectuate the grantor’s intent to tie reversion to use |
| Whether precedent (Stewart v. Blain) controls | Stewart interpreted similar language as creating ownership only so long as property was used for school purposes and held reversion occurred despite the building remaining | Club contends Stewart improperly departed from plain language or is distinguishable | Appellant contends Stewart is factually and legally on point and supports a use‑based reverter |
| Effect of harmonizing multiple deed provisions | All school‑purpose recitals, the granting clause, habendum, and reverter clause must be read together to effectuate intent | Club treats the reverter clause in isolation, focusing on the physical presence of the building | Appellant insists harmonization yields a use‑condition that triggered reversion when the school ceased operations |
Key Cases Cited
- Luckel v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991) (deed interpretation governed by four‑corners rule; courts must harmonize provisions and give effect to all words)
- Stewart v. Blain, 159 S.W. 928 (Tex. Civ. App. Galveston 1913) (similar deed language held to create ownership so long as property was used for school purposes; reversion occurs when use ceases even if building remains)
- City of Houston v. Van De Mark, 83 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002) (courts must review all words in the deed when interpreting reverter clauses)
- Cherokee Water Co. v. Freeman, 33 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000) (court must give effect to all words used in an instrument)
- Harkey v. Harkey, 60 S.W.2d 834 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1933) (construction principles applied in deeds with conditional limitations)