Chеrokee Water Company appeals from a declaratory judgment construing three deeds favorable to the claims of the children of J.A. Freeman, the children of W.R. Freeman, and the heirs of James C. Freeman (the Freemans). In four points of error Cherokee contends that the trial court erred (1) in finding the deeds ambiguous, therеby misinterpreting the deeds of W.R. and J.A. Freeman, and (2) in concluding that subsequent acts and statements made by representatives of Cherokee indicated the intent of the grantors.
The deed provisions to be construed are those in the respective deeds granting or reserving to the Freemans and their children and/or heirs the rights to fish, boat, аnd otherwise use Cherokee Lake and the Freemans’ adjacent lots for recreational purposes. The trial court found all three deeds ambiguous and, based on evidence of the parties’ intention, declared that the Freemans currently are entitled to exercise those rights. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the deeds from J.A. and Lonie Freeman and from W.R. and Dessie Freeman are ambiguous, and further erred in construing their provisions. We conclude that the trial court correctly construed the deed from J.C. and Mattie Freeman. Therefore, we reform the judgment in part, and as reformed, affirm the judgment.
In January of 1948, Cherokee, in an еffort to acquire land for public use, instituted condemnation proceedings against J.A. and Lonie Freeman, W.R. and Dessie Freeman, and James C. and Mattie Freeman, respectively. A few months later, each group of the Freemans conveyed a portion of their land, by general warranty *352 deed, to Cherokee in full settlement of the controversy. W.R. Freeman and his wife Dessie executed their deed on May 24, 1948. J.A. Freeman and his wife Lonie executed their deed on May 25, 1948. James C. Freeman and his wife Mattie executed their deed on March 25, 1949. The two 1948 deeds contain substantially similar granting language, the first of which in pertinent part states:
The Grantor and his children living or visiting with him are hereby given by the Grantee а right to fish on the land above described, which is to be included in a part of Cherokee Lake; such right including with it the right to anchor a boat on the shore line, with access to said boat. This right to fish shall be governed by the same rules and regulations as may be imposed upon those who are allowed to fish in said Lake as to the time of taking fish, the kind аnd size of fish to be taken from said Lake. This right is personal and cannot be sold or assigned.
(Emphasis added.) The second deed, executed by J.A. and Lonie Freeman, similarly states:
The Grantee hereby agrees that, when said Lake is completed, the Grantors together with their children living or visiting with them (except W. R., J.C. and Noah Freeman) are herеby given the right to go upon the waters covering the above land and fish therein, subject, however, to such rules and regulations as may be imposed from time to time upon those who are authorized to fish in said Lake; such rules governing the number[,] kind, and size of fish taken, as well as the time when such fish can be caught. The rights herein granted to fish are persоnal and are not, subject to sale or assignment. To enter the water covering the above land, the Grantors are hereby given a right of way over and a right to use, for the purpose of anchor-
ing a boat, Lot Number 8 in Block SQ of Lake Cherokee sub-division. The right of Grantors to use said lot is subject to the rules as may be established by Lake Cherokee, governing sanitary conditions on said Lot.
(Emphasis added.) The third deed, executed in March of 1949 by James C. and Mattie Freeman, states in pertinent part: [T]he Grantors are hereby given the right to select one of the above lots and to make such selection within ten (10) days after they have been notified that said lots have bеen located and staked on the ground. The Grantors and their Heirs shall have the right to use said lot for and during the natural life of either of them. Said lot shall not be used for commercial purposes but shall be used for a camp house, picnic ground, and to enter Lake Cherokee for the purposes of fishing as herein granted.
The Grantors and their Heirs are hereby granted the right to go upon Lake Cherokee for the purpose of fishing and recreation, but such rights shall be governed by the same rules and regulations as the Grantee may impose upon all persons that it gives permission to enter said Lake for recreational and fishing privileges.
(Emphasis added.)
Following the deaths of all the original grantors, a dispute arose between Cherokee and the children of the grantors concerning whether the various fishing and recreational rights mentioned in the deeds survived the grantors’ deaths. To resolve the dispute, Cherokee, in 1996, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment to construe the provision in J.A. and Lonie Freеman’s deed. Cherokee subsequently filed two additional suits, one for each of the other two deeds, and stipulated that all the eases would be tried together in the District Court of Rusk County, Texas. 1 In response, the Freemans filed various coun *353 terclaims against Cherokee, all of which were severed from the deed construction issues and disposed of by the summary judgment. The Freemans aрpealed the summary judgment to this Court, and we affirmed the trial court’s decision. 2 The deed construction issues eventually were heard, and the trial court found: (1) that the two 1948 deeds were ambiguous as a matter of law, and, based on extrinsic evidence, the grantors’ intent was that the various rights survive their death and pass to their children to enjoy for their fives; (2) that the grantors of the 1949 deed intended for the rights to survive their death and pass to their heirs based on the use of the word heirs; and (3) that although Cherokee was the grantee in all deeds, Cherokee was the grantor of the fishing and recreational rights at issue.
In its first and second points of error, Cherokee contends that the trial court erred by misapplying the rules of deed constructiоn in finding the two 1948 deeds ambiguous, and also erred by admitting extrinsic evidence to determine the grantors’ intent. A court’s primary goal when construing a deed is to ascertain the true intention of the parties as expressed within the “four corners” of the instrument.
See Luckel v. White,
After a careful review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred both in finding the two 1948 deeds ambiguous and *354 in admitting extrinsic evidence to show the grantors’ intent.
The trial court found the following granting language ambiguous: (1) W.R. Freeman and his wife Dessies’ deed stating in pertinent part, “The Grantor and his children
living or visiting with him
are hereby given ... a right to fish ... [and] the right to anchor a boat on the shoreline ...” (emphasis added); (2) J.A. Freeman and his wife Lonies’ deed stating in pertinent part, “[T]he Grantors
together with their children living or visiting with them ...
are hereby given the right to go upon the waters ... and fish therein ... [and] a right of way ... for the purpose of anchoring a boat ...” (emphasis added). The trial court determined that the
living or visiting with
language could be separated from the conjunctive
or
and constitute two separate phrases with two separate meanings. According to this construction, the children must be living
or
visiting with the grantors. In other words, because the qualifying words
with them
only appear after the word
visiting
and not after the word
living,
the children only must be living to claim the fishing and recreational rights. This interpretation is fundamentally flawed. First, it is clearly inconsistent with the requirement that, when construing a conveyance, we give effect to all parts and construe the document as a whole.
See Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews,
In light of the unambiguous nature of the language at issue, the trial court erred in admitting extrinsic evidence in an effort to ascertain the intent of the grantors. The testimony of Albert Freeman, the son of W.R. Freeman, that a Cherokee representative told him he could fish on Lake Cherokee fоrever, as well as the fishing cards given to him by Cherokee with the expiration date blacked out, suggests that perhaps the grantors’ intent was to allow their children to fish on Lake Cherokee forever. Furthermore, in light of the condemnation proceedings and possible lawsuit against the grantors, this continuity idea is consistent with the circumstanсes that led to the deed to Cherokee. That notwithstanding, however, such extrinsic evidence is inadmissible when a deed is unambiguous and the language has a clear and definite meaning. As discussed earlier, as a reviewing court we are not called on to determine what the grantors meant to say, but the meaning of what they did say.
In its third point, Cherоkee contends that the trial court erred by concluding it was the grantor of the rights to fish and anchor a boat. We do not reach this point, however, in light of the trial court’s finding that Cherokee drafted all of the deeds.
3
Whether Cherokee
granted
these rights, as found by the trial court, or
*355
whether the Freemans, the grantors of the land,
reserved
these rights for themselves is of no consequence because the trial court found that Cherokee drafted the deeds, and that finding is unchallenged. Cherokee argues that since the Freemans are the grantors in the deeds, the various fishing and recreational rights constitute reservations by the Freemans, so any ambiguity should be construed in Cherokee’s favor as the grantee. But it is not the identity of the grantor, but the drafter, that is important because the law requires that any doubt should be resolved against the scrivener.
See Texas
Pac.
Coal & Oil Co. v. Masterson,
In its fourth point, Cherokee contends that the trial cоurt erred in construing the 1949 deed executed by James C. and Mattie Freeman to provide that the fishing and boating privileges survive the death of the grantors and are currently held by their heirs. As discussed earlier, the construction of a deed is a question of law. The court’s primary duty when construing a deed is to ascertain the intent of the parties from all of the language contained within the four corners of the document.
Luckel v. White,
We review a trial court’s decision on a question of law de novo.
Barber v. Colorado Indep. Sch. Dist.,
We agree with the trial court that this provision in the third deed is ambiguous. In light of the apparent ambiguity between the phrases grantors and their heirs and for the natural life of either of them, we will resolve the doubt in favor of the Free-mans and against the drafter, Cherokee. Because a person’s heirs are not determined until his or her death, in an effort to give meaning to all the words contained in the deed, we conclude that the antecedent to the pronoun them is the last living grantor and the class of his or her heirs. Plainly stated, the grantors’ heirs would not be determined until one of the grantors died, so either of them must refer to the last living grantor and his or her heirs.
Moreover, because there is doubt as to the proper meaning of the deed in light of these two conflicting phrases, the court properly considered extrinsic evidence to ascertain the facts and circumstances that existed at the time the deed was executed. Additionally, the use of the word heirs in the 1949 deed, executed after execution of the two 1948 deeds, each of which used children, indicates that the drafter, Cherokee, intended for the 1949 deed to have a different meaning. As a whole, the evidence indicates that the last thing the grantors would have intended is to exclude their children and grandchildren from the very rights that they had enjoyed just prior to dеeding their property.
For the above stated reasons, we conclude that the trial court correctly found that the intent of the grantors expressed within the 1949 instrument was for their children and possibly their grandchildren, as their heirs, to enjoy the fishing and recreational rights on Lake Cherokee, and that the fishing and recreational rights reserved in the 1949 deed survived the death of the last living grantor and now belong to the grantors’ heirs.
We reform the judgment to declare that the fishing and recreational rights reserved in the two 1948 deeds did not survive the deaths of the grantors, but that those reserved in the 1949 deed did survive the death of the last living grantor and now are held by that grantor’s heirs.