TRANT v. MURRAY
1:20-cv-01457
D.D.C.Mar 5, 2022Background
- Plaintiff Jennifer Trant, a U.S. Secret Service Officer, shared a small, rotating office with Officer Dung “Jackie” Duong from March–October 2017.
- Trant alleges repeated sexually suggestive comments and unconsented touching by Duong (including staring, calling her "beautiful/hot," sliding a palm down her face, comments about her body, and showing explicit images), occurring over ~7 months and at least 15 times per the EEO report.
- Trant told Duong repeatedly she found the conduct unacceptable; she experienced worsening migraines, anxiety, insomnia, and missed work.
- Trant reported the harassment to management; she alleges management discouraged her from filing an EEO complaint, moved her desk a few feet within the shared office, and later relocated/laterally transferred her away from the White House assignment.
- Defendants (heads of the Secret Service and DHS, sued in official capacities) moved for summary judgment. The court denied summary judgment as to the hostile work environment claim and two retaliation theories (discouraging EEO filing and relocation/lateral transfer) but granted summary judgment on the workstation move claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Duong's conduct created an actionable hostile work environment | Duong's repeated sexual comments, touching, and escalation over ~7 months were objectively and subjectively hostile and interfered with Trant's work/health | Incidents were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to meet Faragher/Harris standard; plaintiff and Duong overlapped infrequently | Denied summary judgment — a reasonable jury could find the conduct was sufficiently severe/pervasive to create a hostile work environment |
| Whether agency is liable for non‑supervisor's harassment (Faragher affirmative defense) | Agency knew or should have known and failed to take prompt/adequate corrective action; dispute when Trant first reported and adequacy of remedial steps | Agency contends it took appropriate remedial measures and denies negligence | Denied summary judgment — factual disputes exist about notice timing and reasonableness of corrective actions, precluding Faragher defense resolution |
| Whether discouraging Trant from filing an EEO complaint was materially adverse retaliation | Management comments discouraged Trant from filing and would deter a reasonable employee from using EEO | Comments were not threatening or did not deter filing | Denied summary judgment — disputed facts permit a jury to find a materially adverse action |
| Whether physical desk move and later lateral relocation were materially adverse retaliation | Desk move made Trant feel blamed; relocation/lateral transfer removed her from overtime/audit work (loss of overtime) | Desk move and reassignment were reasonable remedial/operational acts and not materially adverse | Granted summary judgment for desk move (not materially adverse); denied summary judgment for relocation/lateral transfer (dispute over lost overtime and adverse effect) |
Key Cases Cited
- Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (hostile‑work‑environment totality‑of‑circumstances test in D.C. Circuit)
- Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (U.S. 1993) (objective/subjective hostile work environment standard)
- Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (U.S. 1998) (employer affirmative defense for supervisor harassment and reasonableness of remedial measures)
- Vance v. Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421 (U.S. 2013) (distinguishing supervisor v. coworker harassment rules)
- Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (employer liable where it knew or should have known and failed to take prompt corrective action)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (retaliation standard: materially adverse actions that deter EEO participation)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment burdens)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment standard and inferences)
- Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reassignment/adverse‑action jury question in Title VII context)
- Johnson v. Perez, 823 F.3d 701 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (plaintiff testimony can suffice to survive summary judgment despite potential self‑interest)