TowerNorth Development, LLC. v. City of Geneva, 1:22-cv-04151

TowerNorth and Verizon sued the City of Geneva, Illinois after the City denied their application to build a 100-foot cell tower (disguised as a monopine) on the Oscar Swan property, claiming a significant service gap in the area.
Plaintiffs alleged TCA violations under four counts: unreasonable delay, lack of substantial evidence, effective prohibition of service (47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II)), and preemption (47 U.S.C. § 253(a)).
The court previously dismissed the delay claim, granted summary judgment for the City on the "substantial evidence" count, and sent the "effective prohibition" and preemption claims to an evidentiary hearing.
After Loper Bright overruled Chevron deference, the City argued for application of the more deferential Seventh Circuit test instead of the FCC’s “materially inhibits” standard for effective prohibition claims.
Plaintiffs showed that alternative sites were explored but ultimately did not pursue a technically feasible and comparably priced site (Dempsey 2) in Geneva.
The evidentiary hearing resolved disputed facts, with the court ultimately finding for the City on both the effective prohibition and preemption claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was City’s denial an “effective prohibition” under TCA?	City’s denial materially inhibits wireless service under FCC’s 2018 “materially inhibits” standard.	Denial did not meet even the more deferential pre-Loper Bright VoiceStream test; alternatives not exhausted.	No effective prohibition; denial did not materially inhibit service.
Which legal standard applies after Loper Bright?	FCC’s "materially inhibits" standard is binding under the Hobbs Act, despite end of Chevron.	Chevron is gone; courts should apply VoiceStream’s more locality-friendly test.	FCC standard is binding; “materially inhibits” test applies.
Did city zoning regulations violate Section 253(a)?	The ban on special uses in PUD, combined with permit requirement, effectively prohibits service.	The code allows for application/variance; denial does not rise to a prohibition.	No violation; zoning regulations do not materially inhibit service.
Right to relief under Section 253(a) preemption?	Plaintiffs have standing and a right to seek equitable preemption under the Supremacy Clause.	No private right of action or standing for this type of preemption claim.	Court assumes right exists but finds no factual basis for relief.

VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix Cnty., 342 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2003) (establishes the pre-FCC, highly deferential standard for effective prohibition claims in this circuit)
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013) (affirms the duty to defer to FCC interpretations under Chevron, which was relevant prior to Loper Bright)
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005) (permits agency interpretations to supersede prior circuit precedent under Chevron, referenced pre-Loper Bright)
Omnipoint Holdings, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 586 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009) (localities retain significant though bounded zoning power over telecommunications facilities)
Town of Amherst, N.H. v. Omnipoint Comm’cns. Enters., 173 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1999) (describes balance of local zoning authority vs. carrier needs under the TCA)