Torres v. Jai Dining
1 CA-CV 19-0544
| Ariz. Ct. App. | Mar 29, 2022Background
- Plaintiffs sued patron Cesar Aguilera Villanueva (negligence) and liquor licensee JAI Dining Services (common-law negligence/dram-shop and statutory dram-shop under A.R.S. § 4-311) for deaths caused after a night of drinking.
- At trial the jury awarded $2,000,000, apportioning fault 60% to Villanueva and 40% to JAI, but found JAI liable under common-law theories while finding for JAI on the statutory § 4-311 claim.
- JAI did not raise preemption below but moved for judgment as a matter of law on duty and proximate cause; the superior court denied the motions.
- The Court of Appeals (Torres I) reversed based on superseding/intervening cause; the Arizona Supreme Court vacated that reversal (Torres II), held proximate cause was a jury question, and remanded to allow the Court of Appeals to consider other appellate issues (including preemption) in the first instance.
- On remand the Court of Appeals exercised its discretion to consider waiver and held (1) preemption was not waived under the circumstances and (2) A.R.S. § 4-312(B) validly preempts Plaintiffs’ common-law negligence/dram-shop claims, reversing the judgment against JAI and leaving Plaintiffs’ recovery only against Villanueva.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of preemption issue | JAI waived preemption by not raising it in trial court | Court should consider preemption due to statewide importance and absence of unfair surprise | Court excused waiver and considered preemption (discretionary exception applied) |
| Constitutionality of A.R.S. § 4-312(B) under Ariz. Const. art. 18 § 6 (anti-abrogation) | Young controls; § 4-312(B) unconstitutionally abrogates the common-law dram-shop cause recognized in Ontiveros | Cronin and Dickey show anti-abrogation protects only rights existing in 1912; dram-shop liability did not exist then, so § 4-312(B) is constitutional | § 4-312(B) does not violate the anti-abrogation clause because dram-shop causes did not exist at common law in 1912; Young is not controlling post-Dickey/Cronin |
| Statutory preemption: Does § 4-312(B) preempt common-law dram-shop/negligence claims? | Plaintiffs: statute did not clearly abrogate Ontiveros-based common-law remedies | JAI: § 4-312(B) (read with § 4-311) expressly limits and displaces common-law liability for licensees | Court: § 4-312(B), in conjunction with § 4-311, expressly preempts the common-law dram-shop/negligence claims; judgment for JAI on those claims |
| Proximate cause / superseding intervening cause | Plaintiffs: Villanueva’s later decision to drive was for the jury to decide | JAI: Villanueva’s decision was unforeseeable superseding cause that absolves JAI | Arizona Supreme Court held proximate-cause issue is for the jury; Court of Appeals resolved case on preemption and did not decide duty/proximate cause on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500 (1983) (Arizona Supreme Court recognized a common-law dram-shop cause of action)
- Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513 (1983) (companion case recognizing dram-shop liability and urging legislative response)
- Young v. DFW Corp., 184 Ariz. 187 (1995) (Court of Appeals held § 4-312(B) unconstitutionally abrogated common-law dram-shop claims)
- Cronin v. Sheldon, 195 Ariz. 531 (1999) (anti-abrogation clause protects only actions that existed at common law or evolved from common-law rights as of 1912)
- Dickey ex rel. Dickey v. City of Flagstaff, 205 Ariz. 1 (2003) (applies Cronin; abrogation analysis requires that the specific right of action have existed at time of constitution)
- Torres v. JAI Dining Servs. (Torres II), 252 Ariz. 28 (2021) (Arizona Supreme Court vacated appellate reversal on proximate cause and remanded to address other appellate issues)
- Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 176 Ariz. 340 (1993) (discusses limits of anti-abrogation protection for causes arising from common-law antecedents)