Torres v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 519 F. App'x 1

Gristede’s appeals a district court fee award following a $3.53M FLSA/NY labor-law class settlement, in which plaintiffs’ counsel was awarded $3.858M in fees and costs on a $3.53M settlement.
District court reduced requested attorney rates by up to 25% after reviewing billing records and precedent, then awarded fees totaling 52.2% of the $7.39M recovered (fees plus costs).
The court awarded expert-witness costs of $306,918.64, which Gristede’s challenges as non-recoverable under FLSA; plaintiffs rely on a partial final judgment and New York law exceptions.
Plaintiffs succeeded on summary judgment of FLSA liability and achieved substantial monetary relief (up to $38,000 per class member) plus non-monetary relief.
Gristede’s argues that the fee award is disproportionate to the settlement and should be closer to one-third, and that the district court impermissibly relied on Gristede’s litigation tactics to justify high fees.
The Second Circuit reviews the fee award for abuse of discretion and defers to the district court’s factual findings and overall assessment of reasonableness.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court abused its discretion in reviewing billing records	Torres argues the court failed to meaningfully parse hours and Johnson factors.	Gristede’s contends deeper scrutiny of billing would yield a larger reduction.	No abuse; court reasonably trimmed rates and did not need exhaustive audit.
Whether the district court properly justified the fee award given litigation tactics	Torres asserts tactics inflated hours and costs.	Gristede’s claims improper to penalize for defendants’ defense strategy.	Not clearly erroneous; court may consider tactics as justification for higher costs.
Whether the fee award is proportional to the settlement amount	Torres maintains standard one-third cap should apply.	Gristede’s argues award is excessive relative to recovery and not necessary.	Discretionary; degree of success supports the award; not abuse despite not matching a one-third figure.
Whether expert-witness costs were properly awarded	Torres relies on partial final judgment and New York law exceptions.	Gristede’s challenges recoverability of expert costs.	District court did not abuse discretion; invoices supported costs; argument forfeited.

Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205 (Supreme Court 2011) (essential goal is rough justice, not auditing perfection; factors relevant to reasonableness can guide rates)
Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neigh. Ass’n v. County of Albany, 522 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2008) (case-specific variables in setting reasonable hourly rate; Johnson factors noted)
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974) (Johnson factors guiding fee reasonableness analysis (cited))
Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2011) (guides deference to district court’s analysis of fee awards; general standard)
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (Supreme Court 1992) (fee-shifting and consideration of success as a primary factor)
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (Supreme Court 1983) (fees should reflect reasonable results and effort; lodestar framework context)
Masters v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., 473 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2007) (discusses lodestar and percentage approaches in contingency fee context)
McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2010) (courts may compare hours billed to reasonableness and avoid auditing perfection)
Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000) (cross-checks using hours billed in fee determination)