Torres v. City of Madera, 648 F.3d 1119

Background

Everardo Torres was handcuffed in the back seat of a patrol car when Officer Noriega shot him with a Glock, believing it was a Taser, causing his death.
Noriega had intended to deploy a Taser in dart-tase mode but drew the Glock instead due to weapon confusion.
Noriega had been issued a Taser a year earlier with minimal formal training and was instructed to wear the Taser and Glock on the same dominant-side belt; prior confusion incidents occurred.
Over the next nine months Noriega trained daily under sergeant Lawson on drawing both weapons, but had not trained for the specific risk of weapon confusion when both weapons were holstered on the dominant side.
The district court granted summary judgment finding the mistake reasonable; on appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for trial, recognizing disputed facts about reasonableness.
This is a §1983 survival action alleging Fourth Amendment excessive force; the court addresses whether Noriega’s mistaken use of force violated the Fourth Amendment and whether she is entitled to qualified immunity.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Noriega’s mistaken use of deadly force was objectively unreasonable.	Torres argues the error was unreasonable given Noriega’s weapon confusion history and training.	Noriega contends the force was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.	Yes; jury could find unreasonable given the facts.
Whether the right was clearly established in 2002 for qualified immunity.	Torres contends clearly established law prohibited such mistaken deadly force against an unarmed arrestee.	Noriega argues the law was not clearly established for this specific weapon-mistake scenario.	No absolute bar; the panel held it could be clearly established and denied immunity (reversed on the merits).
Whether summary judgment was appropriate given genuine issues of material fact.	Torres asserts disputed facts about training, perception, and danger preclude summary judgment.	Noriega asserts the record supports the district court’s view that the mistake was reasonable.	No; material disputes remain; summary judgment improper.
What standard governs objective reasonableness in a weapon-mistake context?	Torres supports a totality-of-circumstances approach that could yield liability.	Noriega relies on existing framework that evaluates reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances.	Totality of the circumstances governs; jury may determine reasonableness.
Do Jensen and Wilkins provide clearly established notice for this weapon-mistake case?	Torres cites Jensen and Wilkins as precedent that mistaken identity in officer use of force is unlawful.	Noriega argues precedent does not squarely control weapon-mistake scenarios.	Jensen and Wilkins support lack of immunity; the court found clearly established notice.

Key Cases Cited

Jensen v. City of Oxnard, 145 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 1998) (mistake of fact leading to wrongful deadly force against officer; clearly informs liability)
Wilkins v. City of Oakland, 350 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2003) (mistake of identity leading to deadly force against a fellow officer; clearly establishes liability)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive force standard; objective reasonableness under totality of circumstances)
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (two-step qualified immunity analysis; later refined but cited for framework)
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (prohibition on deadly force against unarmed/non-dangerous suspects absent threat)
Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (excessive force in novel or varying circumstances; expert analysis of risk and warning)
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (reasonable official immunity analysis; general rule for clearly established law)
Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc discussion on weapon-confusion risk informing immunity)
Garrison v. United States, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (reasonableness of warrantless searches depends on belief about premises; cited for error of premises concept)