Tooey v. AK Steel Corp.
623 Pa. 60
| Pa. | 2013Background
- Plaintiffs (Tooey and Landis) worked decades earlier with asbestos exposure and later developed mesothelioma more than 300 weeks after their last exposure; they sued their former employers in tort.
- Employers moved for summary judgment, arguing the WCA’s exclusivity (77 P.S. § 481) bars common‑law claims by employees for work‑related injuries or occupational disease.
- Trial courts denied employers’ motions; the Superior Court reversed based on its prior decisions (Ranalli, Sedlacek) treating the WCA exclusivity as applying even where statutory compensation is time‑barred.
- The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review to decide (1) statutory interpretation of 77 P.S. § 411(2) (the 300‑week proviso), and (2) related constitutional challenges.
- The Supreme Court held the 300‑week proviso removes late‑manifesting occupational disease claims from the Act’s coverage (not merely from compensability), so the exclusivity provision does not bar common‑law suits; constitutional issues were not reached.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §301(c)(2) (77 P.S. § 411(2)) exclude occupational disease that first manifests >300 weeks after last exposure from the Act’s definition of "injury"? | Tooey/Landis: "it shall apply" refers to "this act," so the Act does not apply to diseases manifesting after 300 weeks; therefore exclusivity (§303(a)) does not bar tort claims. | Employers: The proviso limits compensation only ("it" refers to "compensation"); coverage remains under the Act, so exclusivity bars tort suits despite time bar to benefits. | Held for Plaintiffs: the grammatical and contextual reading supports that the Act does not apply to diseases manifesting after 300 weeks; exclusivity does not bar tort suits. |
| If §301(c)(2) ambiguous, how should ambiguity be resolved? | Resolve in favor of liberal, remedial construction benefitting injured workers and avoid leaving a class of injured workers without any remedy. | Favor interpretation preserving exclusivity and legislative compromise limiting employer tort exposure. | Ambiguity (if any) resolved for injured workers consistent with remedial purpose; supports Plaintiffs’ reading. |
| Does allowing tort suits where statute bars compensation undermine the Act’s quid pro quo or expose employers to unlimited liability? | Plaintiffs: no — tort suits require negligence, causation, and allow defendants common‑law defenses; permitting suits avoids leaving some seriously injured workers without any remedy. | Employers: permitting tort suits would defeat legislative compromise and expose employers to potentially unlimited liability. | Court: permitting common‑law claims in this narrow category does not conflict with remedial purpose and avoids leaving workers without remedy; concerns addressed by tort standards/defenses. |
| Are constitutional challenges (Remedies/Open Courts/Equal Protection/Reasonable Compensation) implicated by the statutory interpretation? | Plaintiffs raised constitutional challenges if exclusivity applied to noncompensable occupational disease. | Employers defended the statute; urged that exclusivity applies and constitutional challenges lack merit or should be addressed before allowing suits. | Court declined to reach constitutional claims because it resolved statutory question in Plaintiffs’ favor. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lord Corp. v. Pollard, 695 A.2d 767 (Pa. 1997) (split decision; opinion supporting that common‑law action is barred only after final determination of compensability)
- Boniecke v. McGraw‑Edison Co., 401 A.2d 345 (Pa. 1979) (common‑law claims not barred where no adjudication shows entitlement to statutory relief)
- Greer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 380 A.2d 1221 (Pa. 1977) (inappropriate to bar tort claims on pleadings when factual questions about statutory cognizability exist)
- Kline v. Arden H. Verner Co., 469 A.2d 158 (Pa. 1983) (WCA generally provides exclusive remedy where injury is within the Act, even if some compensation claims fail)
- Moffett v. Harbison‑Walker Refractories Co., 14 A.2d 111 (Pa. 1940) (distinguishing coverage and compensability; historically treated occupational disease scheme as supplanting tort remedies)
- Sporio v. WCAB (Songer Const.), 717 A.2d 525 (Pa. 1998) (manifestation period serves to prevent stale claims and speculation about work‑relation)
- Daley v. A.W. Chesterton, Inc., 37 A.3d 1175 (Pa. 2012) (discussing mesothelioma latency and the rarity of the disease)