Toney v. City of Dayton
2017 Ohio 5618
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Multiple plaintiffs challenged municipal ordinances from Dayton, Trotwood, and West Carrollton that authorize automated camera enforcement for red‑light and speed violations; notices of civil liability are mailed to vehicle owners with administrative-hearing procedures available.
- Plaintiffs filed three consolidated actions alleging the ordinances violate Article I, Section 16 (procedural due process) of the Ohio Constitution and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and unjust enrichment damages.
- Trial court denied plaintiffs' summary‑judgment and class‑certification motions and granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings; plaintiffs appealed.
- Plaintiffs mounted a facial due‑process challenge, arguing the administrative hearing procedures (admission of hearsay without discovery/subpoena power, restrictive affirmative‑defense rules, forced waiver of spousal privilege, and bond requirements) are constitutionally insufficient.
- The ordinances impose modest civil penalties (Dayton up to $250 plus fees; Trotwood and West Carrollton lower), provide an administrative hearing process without express subpoena/discovery powers, list limited affirmative defenses, and in some provisions treat registration evidence as prima facie proof of operation.
- The court applied the Mathews balancing test and rational‑basis review and concluded the ordinances are not facially unconstitutional; plaintiffs’ unjust‑enrichment claim was tied to the constitutional challenge and therefore moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Facial due‑process validity of ordinances | Ordinances deny meaningful process: allow hearsay, bar discovery/subpoenas, limit affirmative defenses, abrogate spousal privilege, and impose bond burdens on indigents | Ordinances provide notice, administrative hearing, opportunity to present defenses; extra procedures (subpoenas/discovery) would undercut efficiency and increase fiscal burden | Ordinances are not facially unconstitutional; Mathews factors and rational‑basis support validity |
| Use of hearsay and lack of subpoena/discovery | Reliance on hearsay without ability to compel declarants risks erroneous deprivation | Administrative hearings may admit hearsay; civil defendants have no constitutional right to confrontation; appeal via R.C. Chapter 2506 available | No due‑process violation on face of ordinances; hearsay admissibility and limited process acceptable given interest at stake |
| Limits on affirmative defenses and spousal privilege | Rules force owners (including spouses) to either pay or implicate third parties/spouses, potentially abrogating spousal privilege | Requirement to identify actual operator is reasonable to ensure accountability; privilege concerns do not render ordinance unconstitutional on its face | Not facially invalid; any spousal‑privilege conflict does not make the ordinance impossible to apply constitutionally |
| Bond requirement for hearings (indigents) | Bond imposes undue burden on indigent defendants, denying meaningful hearing | Interest at stake is modest monetary penalty; due process does not automatically require waiving bond for indigents | Bond requirement does not render ordinance facially unconstitutional; even if problematic for indigents, ordinance can be applied constitutionally to others |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (establishes three‑factor balancing test for procedural due process)
- Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (U.S. 2008) (facial‑challenge principles; avoid hypothetical case speculation)
- Wymsylo v. Bartec, Inc., 970 N.E.2d 898 (Ohio 2012) (high standard for facial challenges; presumption of constitutionality)
- Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Ohio 2007) (use of rational‑basis test for due‑process review absent fundamental‑rights restriction)
- Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio 1986) (ordinance valid if bears real and substantial relation to public health, safety, morals, or welfare)
- Benjamin v. City of Columbus, 146 N.E.2d 854 (Ohio 1957) (test for reasonableness of municipal regulation)
- Stetter v. R.J. Corman Derailment Servs., L.L.C., 927 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio 2010) (Article I, Section 16 is Ohio’s due‑process equivalent)
- Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (U.S. 2011) (due process does not automatically require counsel or certain procedural protections in civil proceedings with modest interests)