Tomra of North America Inc v. Department of Treasury, 952 N.W.2d 384

TOMRA sells and leases reverse‑vending (container‑recycling) machines and repair parts used in retail stores to collect and sort bottles/cans for recycling.
Collected containers are sent to recycling facilities and then sold to manufacturers as raw materials.
TOMRA sought refunds, claiming sales and use tax exemption under the GSTA and UTA industrial‑processing exemption for machines and parts.
The Court of Claims held the machines performed activities that occurred before the statutory industrial‑processing period in MCL 205.54t(7)(a)/205.94o(7)(a) and denied the exemption.
The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding the temporal limitation in (7)(a) does not apply to the discrete activities listed in (3).
The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed: the temporal limitation in (7)(a) does not apply to the enumerated activities in (3), and the strict‑construction canon for tax exemptions was inapplicable because the statute is unambiguous.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the temporal limitation in MCL 205.54t(7)(a)/205.94o(7)(a) bar an exemption when the activity occurs before the (7)(a) timeframe?	TOMRA: Its machines perform an enumerated industrial‑processing activity in MCL 205.54t(3)/205.94o(3) (e.g., recycling/collection/handling), so they qualify regardless of timing.	Treasury: Subsection (7)(a) sets a mandatory start/end period for industrial processing; activities occurring before that period are not exempt.	The Court: Subsection (3) is a specific provision that controls; the temporal limit in (7)(a) does not apply to the activities enumerated in (3). Case remanded for proceedings consistent with that holding.
Must tax‑exemption provisions be strictly construed against the taxpayer here?	TOMRA: The statutory text is clear; ordinary interpretation governs.	Treasury: Tax exemptions should be strictly construed against finding an exemption.	The Court: The strict‑construction canon is a last resort; it applies only if the statute is ambiguous. Here the statute is unambiguous, so the canon is inapplicable.

Detroit Edison Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 498 Mich 28 (2015) (explains that the general definition in (7)(a) and the enumerated activities in (3) are discrete inquiries and that (3) can supply industrial‑processing status where (7)(a) does not)
Ally Fin. Inc. v. State Treasurer, 502 Mich 484 (2018) (confirms interpretive standards and that canons cannot overcome plain statutory text)
United Methodist Church, Inc. v. Sylvan Twp., 416 Mich 340 (1982) (discusses traditional rule that tax exemptions are strictly construed)
Jones v. Enertel, Inc., 467 Mich 266 (2002) (applies the general/specific canon: specific statutory provisions control over general ones)