Tompkins v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., 983 F.3d 74

Plaintiff Shawn Tompkins, a Metro‑North carman since 1988, refused on Jan. 18, 2014 to walk ~3/4 mile from Building 4 to the wheel‑true in snowy/icy conditions; foremen had assessed the route as safe and ordered him out of service pending investigation.
Metro‑North charged Tompkins with insubordination; after a disciplinary hearing he received an actual suspension (later reduced) and arbitration upheld the reduced penalty.
On Feb. 16, 2014 Tompkins questioned Foreman Palmietto in the lunchroom about the earlier incident; Palmietto felt threatened, Vasquez investigated (interviewing only Palmietto), and Tompkins was charged with conduct unbecoming and suspended; arbitration later overturned that penalty and awarded back pay.
Tompkins alleged FRSA violations: (1) unlawful retaliation for refusing to work when confronted with a hazardous condition (refusal to walk), or alternatively (2) retaliation for reporting unsafe walkway conditions.
The district court granted Metro‑North summary judgment; on appeal the Second Circuit affirmed, holding (a) Tompkins’s refusal was not protected because he failed the objective prong of the reasonableness test, and (b) his reporting did not raise a triable issue that retaliation was a contributing factor to the discipline.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Tompkins’s refusal to walk was FRSA‑protected refusal to work	Tompkins subjectively believed walkways were hazardous and therefore refusal was protected	Metro‑North: foremen and coworkers assessed walk as safe; Tompkins offered no objective evidence of imminent danger	Court: No — FRSA requires subjective and objective reasonableness; Tompkins met only subjective prong and failed to raise a triable issue on objective reasonableness
Whether reporting unsafe walkways was a "contributing factor" in disciplinary actions under FRSA	Reporting safety concerns contributed to discipline for the wheel‑true and lunchroom incidents	Metro‑North: discipline was for insubordination and later for lunchroom conduct; intervening events, union representation, and appeals/ arbitration undermine any inference of retaliatory motive	Court: No — plaintiff must show some evidence of retaliatory intent; Gunderson factors applied and record lacks proof that reporting motivated discipline

Nielsen v. AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214 (2d Cir. 2014) (adopts subjective+objective reasonableness standard for whistleblower claims)
Bechtel v. Admin. Review Bd., 710 F.3d 443 (3d Cir. 2013) (adopts burden‑shifting framework applied to FRSA claims)
Kuduk v. BNSF Ry. Co., 768 F.3d 786 (8th Cir. 2014) (discusses causation/“contributing factor” and evidence required to show retaliation)
Gunderson v. BNSF Ry. Co., 850 F.3d 962 (8th Cir. 2017) (identifies multi‑factor approach for assessing whether protected activity contributed to discipline)
Armstrong v. BNSF Ry. Co., 880 F.3d 377 (7th Cir. 2018) (requires proof of retaliatory motive as component of FRSA retaliation)
Lockhart v. Long Island R.R. Co., 266 F. Supp. 3d 659 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (applies Bechtel burden shifting to FRSA context)
Hernandez v. Metro‑N. Commuter R.R., 74 F. Supp. 3d 576 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (applies Nielsen standard to FRSA refusal‑to‑work claims)
Doro v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, 498 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2007) (standard of review for summary judgment)