Tommy James Rumph v. State of Alaska, A13952

Rumph was convicted of first-degree murder, weapons misconduct, and drug possession for shooting and killing Treavonne Owens. 1
At trial, Rumph claimed self-defense and sought to introduce evidence that Owens had threatened him and had a reputation for carrying weapons. 2
The trial court excluded Parrilla’s hearsay testimony about Rumph’s statement that Owens threatened his family and limited Allridge’s reputation testimony to violence, not carrying weapons. 3
After the verdict, juror P.F. emailed and then swore in an affidavit that deliberations were tainted by racial bias, extraneous information about witness Allridge, and pressure over the cost of a hung jury. 4
Rumph moved for a new trial and an evidentiary hearing, but the superior court denied the motion under Evidence Rule 606(b) and Peña-Rodriguez. 5
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding any evidentiary errors harmless and concluding Rumph failed to make the threshold showing required to pierce the no-impeachment rule. 6

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was excluding Rumph’s hearsay statement harmless? 7	Rumph said his call to Parrilla was an excited utterance showing self-defense.	State said the statement was hearsay and any error was harmless.	Any error was harmless because other evidence proved Owens threatened Rumph. 8
Was limiting Allridge’s testimony about weapons harmless? 9	Rumph said Owens’s weapon-carrying reputation was a relevant character trait.	State said carrying weapons is not a character trait and the limitation was proper.	Any error was harmless because other evidence showed Owens carried weapons. 10
Did P.F.’s affidavit justify breaching Rule 606(b) for racial bias? 11	Rumph argued P.F.’s affidavit showed juror racial animus under Peña-Rodriguez.	State said the affidavit was conclusory and race-neutral.	No; the affidavit lacked specific, clear statements showing racial animus. 12
Was an evidentiary hearing required on the racial-bias claim? 13	Rumph claimed the court had to investigate further before denying relief.	State said no prima facie showing required a hearing.	No; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining a hearing. 14
Did Rule 606(b) allow inquiry into Allridge and hung-jury allegations? 15	Rumph argued juror comments were extraneous prejudicial information.	State said they were internal deliberations barred by Rule 606(b).	No; both allegations were barred or, regarding Allridge, harmless. 16

Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. 206 (U.S. 2017) (recognizes a narrow constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule for clear statements of racial animus 17)
Titus v. State, 963 P.2d 258 (Alaska 1998) (interprets Alaska Evidence Rule 606(b) and its exception for extraneous prejudicial information 18)
Liddicoat v. State, 268 P.3d 355 (Alaska 2011) (affidavits supporting post-trial relief must state specific facts based on personal knowledge 19)
State v. Agoney, 608 P.2d 762 (Alaska 1980) (excited-utterance test asks whether the statement was spontaneous or the product of reflection 20)
Gottschalk v. State, 881 P.2d 1139 (Alaska App. 1994) (a victim’s violent character is admissible when self-defense is claimed 21)
Charles v. State, 780 P.2d 377 (Alaska App. 1989) (statement made after a lapse of time can still qualify as an excited utterance 22)