953 F.3d 560
9th Cir.2020Background
- Tomas Rodriguez Infante was convicted of first-degree murder (2014) after a California jury trial; post-conviction he filed a federal habeas petition challenging the removal of an impaneled juror (Juror 8).
- Juror 8, initially seated despite noting caregiving obligations, approached the bench before opening statements and said the defendant “looks like my uncle” and that serving would be “hard” for him; he twice said this could affect impartiality, then later said he could be impartial.
- The trial judge, concerned Juror 8’s statements reflected an inability to be impartial (and that his later assurance might be coached), excused the juror for cause over defense objection and replaced him with an alternate.
- The California Court of Appeal affirmed the removal under Penal Code §1089, the California Supreme Court denied review, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
- Infante’s federal habeas petition was denied by the district court (which found his Batson-based equal protection claim procedurally barred under Haney and rejected due process claims); Infante appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit held Haney did not bar review (because this was a judge’s for-cause strike explained on the record) and affirmed the denial of habeas relief on the merits, concluding the judge permissibly relied on the juror’s own statements, not impermissible race-based assumptions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Haney bars raising a Batson/equal protection claim in habeas when no contemporaneous Batson objection was made at trial | Infante: Haney should not bar review because the judge’s on-the-record explanation preserved the basis for review and this was a judicial (not peremptory) strike | State: Haney requires a Batson objection to create a record for habeas review | Held: Haney does not bar review here—judicial for-cause strikes explained on the record are reviewable |
| Whether the judge’s removal of Juror 8 violated the Equal Protection Clause/Batson (impermissible race-based assumption of partiality) | Infante: Judge impermissibly inferred bias from juror’s race/ethnicity; juror’s later statement that race “doesn’t have nothing to do with that” undermines a finding of bias | State: Juror injected race into voir dire and repeatedly said it would be “hard” to be impartial; judge permissibly relied on juror’s own statements and on additional circumstances suggesting insincerity | Held: No Batson/equal protection violation—the strike was based on Juror 8’s own expressions of potential bias, not on drawing impermissible inferences from race |
| Whether due process and Sixth Amendment impartial-jury claims succeed | Infante: Removal deprived him of a fair, impartial jury and his right to the particular tribunal selected | State: Same reasons defeat these claims; juror’s statements justified for-cause removal | Held: Due process and Sixth Amendment claims fail for the same reason as the equal protection claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (established prohibition on race-based peremptory strikes and the three-step Batson framework)
- Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (racial discrimination in juror selection violates equal protection)
- United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2007) (juror who injected race into voir dire justified for-cause removal based on his own statements)
- Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 81 (9th Cir. 2010) (juror's admission that experiences with racism might affect fairness supported non-discriminatory strike)
- Haney v. Adams, 641 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2011) (requires timely Batson objection for peremptory-strike claims on habeas to preserve trial record)
- Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007) (a juror’s assurance of impartiality is not always dispositive when other statements indicate bias)
- Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (discusses predisposition to favor a party and juror partiality principles)
- Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (reiterates the perniciousness of racial discrimination in juries and limits on race-based assumptions)