Toledo v. Ohio, 56 N.E.3d 997

Background

Toledo enacted an automated red-light and speed photo-enforcement ordinance (Toledo Mun. Code 313.12) that imposed civil penalties on vehicle owners and set administrative procedures for contesting notices.
Ohio enacted Am. Sub. S.B. 342 (effective March 23, 2015), imposing statewide conditions on photo-monitoring devices (e.g., officer presence at devices, signage, 3-year safety studies, public-awareness periods, minimum speed thresholds for camera-issued speeding citations, hearing procedures, manufacturer maintenance/certification rules).
Toledo sued, alleging S.B. 342 violated the Ohio Constitution’s home-rule provision (Article XVIII, §3) by impermissibly restricting municipal self-governance; the trial court granted partial injunctions against several S.B. 342 provisions.
The state appealed, arguing S.B. 342 is a valid “general law” under the Canton four-part test and therefore preempts conflicting municipal regulation.
The Sixth District affirmed the trial court: it held the challenged S.B. 342 provisions are not general laws (failing Canton prongs 2, 3, and 4), severed the unconstitutional sections, and certified conflict with Second District decisions for the Ohio Supreme Court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (City)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether S.B. 342 is a “general law” under Canton (part 3): does it set forth police/similar regulations or merely limit municipal legislative power?	S.B. 342 primarily limits municipal legislative authority and directs municipalities’ internal administration and police duties (e.g., officer presence, studies, hearing procedures), so it purports to limit home-rule powers.	S.B. 342 creates statewide uniform regulation of photo-monitoring systems and therefore sets forth police regulations rather than merely restricting municipal power.	Held for City: provisions impermissibly limit municipal legislative power; failed Canton prong.
Whether S.B. 342 prescribes a rule of conduct upon citizens generally (Canton prong 4)	The statute targets municipalities, not citizens; only isolated provisions affect motorists after citation and thus it does not prescribe citizen conduct generally.	The statutes include rules affecting motorists, manufacturers, insurers, and adjudicative procedures and thus prescribe conduct generally.	Held for City: statutes do not prescribe rules of conduct upon citizens generally; failed Canton prong.
Whether S.B. 342 operates uniformly/statewide (Canton prong 2) given resource and feasibility differences among municipalities	The statute’s conditions (e.g., officer presence) are impractical for large cities with many cameras and limited officers, so it will not operate uniformly across municipalities.	Uniform rules apply to all municipalities; disparate effects reflect municipal choices (number of cameras), not nonuniform legislation.	Held for City: statutes do not operate uniformly in practice; failed Canton prong.
Remedy / severability: If unconstitutional, should offending provisions be severed?	Sever the offending provisions and leave remaining scheme intact.	(Argued constitutionality; alternative remedies not emphasized.)	Court severed identified provisions (listed in opinion) and left remainder operative.

Key Cases Cited

Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149 (establishes four-part test to determine whether a statute is a "general law" for home-rule analysis)
Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33 (read statutory chapters in pari materia; three-part home-rule analysis; speed-limit regulation as statewide scheme)
Walker v. Toledo, 143 Ohio St.3d 420 (municipal use of automated traffic enforcement imposes civil liability is permissible under home rule jurisprudence)
Marich v. Bob Bennett Constr. Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 553 (R.C. chapter as comprehensive statewide regulatory enactment supports general-law finding)
Cleveland v. State, 128 Ohio St.3d 135 (presumption of constitutionality; guidance on severability and statutory interpretation)