Toledo v. Blackshear, 2020 Ohio 1233

Appellant Ishmial Blackshear (Bey) was charged with OVI (R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)) and two minor misdemeanors; he went pro se to a bench trial and was convicted, but this court reversed that conviction for failure to conduct a proper colloquy about self-representation.
After remand additional charges (driving while under suspension and expired registration) were consolidated; Bey sought to enter an Alford plea to the OVI and dismissals were offered for the other charges.
At an April 3, 2019 hearing Bey insisted he did not want an attorney but simultaneously refused to waive the right to counsel; the presiding judge recused after concluding communication was ineffective.
At a second hearing on April 17, 2019 a different judge again advised Bey about the Alford plea, penalties, and right to counsel; Bey said he would “proceed on [his] own” and denied waiving rights but acknowledged the hazards of proceeding without counsel.
The court accepted Bey’s Alford plea, found him guilty of OVI, dismissed the consolidated charges, sentenced him (90 days, 87 suspended, fines, costs, one-year license suspension), and Bey appealed raising three assignments of error (waiver of counsel, Rule 11/Traf.R.10 compliance, voluntariness of the Alford plea).
The Sixth District affirmed, holding Bey validly waived counsel and that the court substantially complied with Traf.R.10(D)/Crim.R.11(E) and that the Alford plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

Issue	Bey's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether Bey voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel	Trial court failed to secure a valid waiver; prior case law required a fuller colloquy before proceeding without counsel	Bey repeatedly said he did not want or need a lawyer; the court advised him of rights/penalties and a waiver can be inferred from conduct that would otherwise frustrate the process	Waiver was valid. Court found Bey knowingly and intelligently waived counsel based on the record and his conduct
Whether the court complied with Traf.R.10(D)/Crim.R.11(E) in accepting the Alford plea	Court failed to inform Bey that an Alford plea is a complete admission of guilt (effect of plea)	Substantial compliance is sufficient for nonconstitutional Rule obligations; court adequately explained effect and had earlier, detailed colloquy	Substantial compliance satisfied Traf.R.10(D); Rule 11 obligations met
Whether Bey's Alford plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent	Plea was not valid because counsel waiver and Rule 11 defects made the plea involuntary	Plea followed advisements, Bey understood penalties and factual basis, and prior hearings reinforced understanding	Plea was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; conviction affirmed

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (recognizes plea where defendant maintains innocence but concedes prosecution has sufficient evidence)
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal prosecutions)
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004) (plea hearing is a critical stage requiring counsel protections)
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948) (valid waiver requires apprehension of nature of charges, punishments, defenses, and essential facts)
State v. Gibson, 45 Ohio St.2d 366 (1976) (trial court must inquire sufficiently to ensure defendant intelligently relinquishes right to counsel)
State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio St.3d 210 (2006) (waiver inquiry depends on case-specific factors like defendant sophistication and charge complexity)
State v. Watkins, 99 Ohio St.3d 12 (2003) (Traf.R.10(D) compliance by informing defendant of plea effect via Traf.R.10(B))
State v. Blatnick, 17 Ohio App.3d 201 (1984) (OVI is a traffic offense)
State v. Hook, 33 Ohio App.3d 101 (1986) (waiver may be inferred where assertion of right to counsel is used to frustrate or delay proceedings)