Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education
57 Cal. 4th 197
| Cal. | 2013Background
- Today’s Fresh Start, a nonprofit operating a countywide charter in Los Angeles County, faced a County Office investigation identifying numerous alleged operational, testing, governance, and fiscal deficiencies and was given a Corrective Action Plan.
- The County Superintendent recommended revocation; the County Board held public meetings (including Nov. 6 hearing) and received staff reports and binders of investigative materials; Today’s Fresh Start submitted voluminous rebuttal materials and spoke at multiple meetings.
- The County Board voted to revoke the charter; the State Board of Education affirmed by an equally divided vote on appeal.
- The trial court granted mandamus relief, finding (1) the County Board violated statutory/due-process evidentiary rules and (2) the board could not act as impartial decisionmaker; it ordered a new evidentiary hearing before an unbiased hearing officer.
- The Court of Appeal reversed, holding (1) no requirement that the chartering authority formally present evidence at the public hearing and (2) Today’s Fresh Start failed to show an unacceptable probability of bias by the County Board.
- The California Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the Court of Appeal: section 47607’s procedures and the County Board’s process satisfied federal and state due process.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether County Board had disqualifying financial bias | County Board had institutional incentive to revoke charters because charter funding competes with public-school funding | No personal or institutional pecuniary interest shown; county boards don’t generally operate the same K–8 programs and statute discourages competition | No financial bias; plaintiff failed to prove an intolerable risk of actual bias |
| Whether overlapping investigatory/prosecutorial and adjudicative functions violated due process (separation of functions) | County Office staff investigated and advocated for revocation and legal counsel advised both staff and board, creating unacceptable risk of bias | Combining investigative/advisory and adjudicative roles is permissible in administrative context absent specific evidence of actual bias | No separation-of-functions violation; staff advice and recommendations do not automatically disqualify the board absent specific evidence of prejudice |
| Whether statute or due process required a formal evidentiary presentation of the chartering authority’s case at the prerevocation hearing | Board must introduce all supporting evidence at the public hearing so petitioner can confront and rebut it | Statute requires a “public hearing in the normal course of business,” not a formal evidentiary trial; petitioner received the investigative materials in advance and multiple chances to respond | No statutory or constitutional requirement for formal evidentiary presentation; procedures satisfied Mathews balancing and were adequate |
| Sufficiency of notice / opportunity to cure before revocation | Notices and corrective plan did not make clear the most critical charges or allow meaningful rebuttal absent staff presentation | The Corrective Action Plan and staff reports gave detailed notice; petitioner had multiple opportunities to respond in writing and orally | Notice and cure opportunities were adequate; petitioner had meaningful opportunity to be heard |
Key Cases Cited
- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (U.S. 1976) (framework for balancing private interest, risk of erroneous deprivation, and government interest to determine what process is due)
- Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (U.S. 1975) (combination of investigative and adjudicative functions in the same agency does not automatically violate due process)
- Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (U.S. 1985) (pretermination due process requires notice and an opportunity to respond; full evidentiary hearing not always required)
- Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1927) (judge with direct pecuniary interest in outcome violates due process)
- Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (U.S. 1972) (institutional financial interest producing a substantial portion of municipal revenue can create disqualifying bias)
- Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (U.S. 2009) (extreme probability of bias from campaign-funded influence requires recusal)
- Trade Comm’n v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (U.S. 1948) (unitary administrative agencies may investigate and adjudicate; prior views do not preclude reasoned reconsideration)
- Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1971) (administrative examiners may develop facts inquisitorially without acting as advocates)
- Haas v. County of San Bernardino, 27 Cal.4th 1017 (Cal. 2002) (discusses constitutional prohibition on adjudication by financially interested decisionmakers)
- Griggs v. Board of Trustees, 61 Cal.2d 93 (Cal. 1964) (superintendent may recommend action so long as board independently considers the matter)