Toby Joseph Welch v. Iowa Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Division
2011 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 58
| Iowa | 2011Background
- Welch was pulled over for driving the wrong way on a one-way street; a preliminary breath test showed alcohol impairment.
- At 2:14 a.m. Welch was asked to submit to chemical testing; he initially refused at 2:20 a.m. and did not sign the refusal box.
- Welch then spoke with others and, at 2:23 a.m., reaffirmed refusal and was informed he would lose his license for one year.
- Welch later attempted to obtain counsel and, at 2:31 a.m., expressed willingness to blow; the officer stated it was too late and Welch had refused.
- IDOT revoked Welch’s license for one year under Iowa Code § 321J.9(1)(a) due to the initial refusal; Welch challenged the revocation administratively and judicially.
- Administrative and judicial review upheld the revocation; Welch appeals to determine whether a subsequent consent can cure an initial refusal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an initial refusal is determinative under 321J.6(2) and 321J.9(1). | Welch argues later consent cures the initial refusal within a short time. | IDOT argues one refusal is determinative and cannot be cured by later consent. | One refusal remains determinative; later consent cannot cure. |
| Whether a flexible five-factor test should govern curing of a prior refusal. | Welch urges adoption of Standish five-factor flexible approach to allow curing. | IDOT urges maintaining bright-line rule to ensure public safety and administrative clarity. | Court rejects flexible five-factor approach; retains bright-line rule that initial refusal is binding. |
| Whether the Iowa Supreme Court should overrule its prior precedents on refusals to submit to chemical testing. | Welch seeks overruling to allow curing under certain conditions. | IDOT emphasizes stare decisis and legislative silence affirming the bright-line rule. | Court declines to overrule; preserves four decades of precedent upholding the initial-refusal rule. |
Key Cases Cited
- Krueger v. Fulton, 169 N.W.2d 875 (Iowa 1969) (one refusal is determinative; two-hour window does not confer further rights)
- Swenumson v. Iowa Dep’t of Public Safety, 210 N.W.2d 660 (Iowa 1973) (conditional refusal equates to conclusive refusal; reaffirmed one-refusal rule)
- Hoffman v. Iowa Dep’t of Transportation, 257 N.W.2d 22 (Iowa 1977) (six minutes between refusals still upheld one-refusal rule)
- State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1978) (right to consult attorney before deciding whether to submit)
- Fuller v. State, 275 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1979) (attorney consultation does not undermine the one-refusal principle)