179 Conn. App. 95
Conn. App. Ct.2018Background
- In 2010 Waterbury issued a 2004 grand-list certificate of change removing Tirado’s vehicle after she provided proof she resided in Torrington on Oct. 1, 2004; Waterbury forwarded that certificate to Torrington. Torrington’s assessor then issued a certificate of change (March 24, 2010) adding Tirado’s vehicle to Torrington’s 2004 grand list and assessed tax.
- Tirado sued Torrington in 2014 seeking damages and asserting Torrington acted without authority by issuing the certificate of change after the three‑year limit in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12‑57 (as she read it).
- Torrington pleaded that the Waterbury change was properly issued and that motor vehicles are governed by § 12‑57(b) (no three‑year limit for motor vehicles).
- The trial court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, reasoning Tirado failed to exhaust administrative remedies under § 12‑117a (no appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals) and, alternatively, that she failed to comply with the one‑year filing requirement of § 12‑119 if that statute applied.
- On appeal, the court agreed § 12‑119 did not apply to Tirado’s claim (her claim did not fit § 12‑119’s categories) but held § 12‑117a did apply and dismissal was proper because she never appealed to the board first. Tirado’s lack‑of‑notice claim was not considered because it was raised for the first time on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12‑119 (one‑year remedy) governs Tirado’s claim | Tirado argued Torrington violated the 3‑year limit in § 12‑57 and thus § 12‑119 applied | Torrington argued the claim did not fit § 12‑119’s statutory categories and motor vehicles fall under § 12‑57(b) | Court: § 12‑119 does not apply (Tirado’s claim fits neither § 12‑119 category) |
| Whether Tirado had to exhaust administrative remedies under § 12‑117a before suing | Tirado contended court misapplied law and should review statutory interpretation on merits | Torrington asserted Tirado was required to appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals first under § 12‑117a | Court: § 12‑117a applies; Tirado failed to appeal to the board and thus failed to exhaust remedies; subject matter jurisdiction lacking |
| Whether court could raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte | Tirado argued raising jurisdiction sua sponte was improper where statute‑of‑limitations defense could be waived | Torrington maintained exhaustion is jurisdictional and may be raised at any time | Court: proper to raise jurisdiction sua sponte here because failure to exhaust is jurisdictional; (if case had depended solely on § 12‑119 limitations, sua sponte raising could have been improper because limitations may be waived) |
| Whether lack of notice to Tirado excused exhaustion or late challenge | Tirado claimed for first time on appeal she did not receive timely notice of the certificate/assessment | Torrington relied on trial record (Tirado had provided proof to Waterbury) and absence of timely notice was not litigated below | Court: declined to consider lack‑of‑notice argument because it was not raised at trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Interlude, Inc. v. Skurat, 253 Conn. 531 (explains the scope of § 12‑119 and two categories of claims)
- Konover v. West Hartford, 242 Conn. 727 (describes § 12‑117a procedure and trial court’s two‑step function on appeal)
- Piteau v. Board of Education, 300 Conn. 667 (requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before Superior Court jurisdiction)
- Second Stone Ridge Cooperative Corp. v. Bridgeport, 220 Conn. 335 (holding § 12‑119 unavailable when claim does not meet statutory categories)
- Fairchild Heights Residents Assn., Inc. v. Fairchild Heights, Inc., 310 Conn. 797 (administrative remedies must be exhausted if adequate)
- L. G. DeFelice & Son, Inc. v. Wethersfield, 167 Conn. 509 (limits on sua sponte raising of waivable statute‑of‑limitations defenses)
- Wheelabrator Bridgeport, L.P. v. Bridgeport, 320 Conn. 332 (example of § 12‑119 excessive valuation claims)
- Griswold Airport, Inc. v. Madison, 289 Conn. 723 (example of airport’s § 12‑119 excessive assessment claim)
- Hotshoe Enterprises, LLC v. Hartford, 284 Conn. 833 (example of § 12‑119 tax‑exemption/authority claims)
- Faith Center, Inc. v. Hartford, 192 Conn. 434 (religious organization using § 12‑119 for tax‑exemption challenge)