Timothy Vallejo v. United States, 803 F.3d 878

Background

Martinez (age 16) and Vallejo (age 17) pled guilty to RICO violations based on predicate acts that included the 2003 murder of Kevin Hirschfield and other attempted murders; both received life sentences.
Their plea agreements noted the statutory maximum penalty included life and preserved the district court’s discretion to impose any sentence authorized by law.
At separate sentencing hearings the district court considered mitigating youth-related factors but imposed life after weighing aggravating facts and § 3553(a) factors.
Neither petitioner appealed their sentences; after Miller v. Alabama (2012) they filed § 2255 motions arguing their life terms for juvenile offenses violated Miller.
The district court denied relief, concluding § 1963(a) (RICO sentencing) sets a maximum, not a mandatory, life term when a predicate offense carries life; the court therefore performed individualized sentencing as Miller requires.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding § 1963(a) ambiguous but, in light of text, structure, legislative history, and consistent practice, it establishes a maximum life term rather than a mandatory one.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1963(a) mandates life imprisonment when a predicate offense authorizes life	Martinez/Vallejo: § 1963(a) should be read to require life whenever a predicate crime carries life	Government: § 1963(a) sets maximums—20 years ordinarily, life only as a maximum when a predicate allows life; sentencing remains discretionary	Held: § 1963(a) is best read to set maximums (not a mandatory life); sentencing was discretionary
Whether Miller v. Alabama entitles petitioners to resentencing	Petitioners: Miller bars life-without-parole for juveniles and requires new sentencing because their life terms arose from juvenile conduct	Government: Miller applies only to mandatory schemes; petitioners received individualized sentencing so Miller does not require relief	Held: No Miller violation because sentences were imposed after individualized consideration and were not statutorily mandatory
Whether the sentencing was individualized as Miller requires	Petitioners: Sentences reflect a de facto mandatory life and did not adequately account for youth	Government: District court considered youth, family, and other mitigating factors before imposing life	Held: District court considered youth-related mitigation; sentencing was individualized
Whether ambiguity in § 1963(a) should be resolved in petitioners’ favor	Petitioners: Ambiguity should support reading in a bar to discretionary lesser sentences	Government: Text, structure, legislative history, and practice resolve ambiguity in favor of maximum-only reading	Held: Ambiguity resolved by statutory structure, history, and practice in favor of government’s interpretation

Key Cases Cited

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (mandatory life-without-parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; sentencing authorities must consider youth)
United States v. Jones, 372 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2004) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
River Rd. Hotel Partners, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011) (approach to statutory ambiguity and textual/structural analysis)
United States v. Misc. Firearms, Explosives, Destructive Devices & Ammunition, 376 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2004) (use of text and structure to resolve ambiguous statutes)
Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209 (2005) (Congressional text choices inform statutory interpretation)
Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (refusal to read in statutory language Congress did not include)
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (sentencing flexibility and individualized sentencing principles)
Five Points Rd. Joint Venture v. Johanns, 542 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 2008) (legislative history may be consulted to resolve ambiguity)
United States v. Fields, 325 F.3d 286 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (practice of imposing RICO sentences below life where predicate allows life)