A jury сonvicted William J. Jones under 18 U.S.C. § 656 on nineteen counts of stealing in excess of $1000 from Bank One’s automatic teller machines (“ATMs”). Jones, who had access to the ATMs through his job as an ATM repairman, challenges his conviction by arguing that § 656 does not apply to him, as he was not an “officer, director, agent or employee of, or connected in any capacity with” Bank One. We affirm the judgment of the district court, finding that under a plain reading of the statute, Jones, who worked for a сompany contracted by Bank One to maintain and service its ATMs, was connected with Bank One and subject to § 656’s prohibitions.
I. History
During the period covered by the su-perceding indictment entered against Jones, National Cash Register Corporation (“NCR”) contracted with Bank One to service its Indianapolis-area ATMs. Jones worked as a repairman for NCR. Generally, when one of Bank One’s ATMs malfunctioned, it would send a signal to NCR’s call center in Columbia, South Carolina. A dispatcher would thеn send a repairperson to the ATM in need of service.
As part of his duties, Jones had access to the cash vaults within the ATMs. Most repairs could be made withоut opening the vault, but NCR left it to its repairpersons’ discretion whether the vault needed to be accessed, either to repair the ATM or to perform rоutine maintenance. The ATMs’ vaults were fitted with special locks that tracked who opened them.
In support of its case at trial, the government offered records that showed Jones as the only person to have opened the vaults to twenty-four ATMs from which money was missing during the relevant time period. It also offеred Jones’s handwritten confession. Jones was convicted, after a two-day jury trial, under 18 U.S.C. § 656 of nineteen separate incidents of stealing money from the ATMs. Jones timely appealed.
II. Analysis
Jones’s sole argument on appeal is that because he worked for NCR and not Bank One, his actions did not fall under § 656.
1
This is a question of law, which we review de novo.
See Olson v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc.,
In the face of a broadly-worded statute, which by its plain terms applies to those “connected in any capacity” with Bank One, see 18 U.S.C. § 656, Jones unconvincingly urges us to limit § 656’s reach to only those categories of persons explicitly enumerated in the statute, i.e. officers, directors, agents, or employees of the banking institution in question. He argues, without citing supporting case law, that the words, “or connected in any capacity with,” renders the enumerated list preceding that phrase meaningless. To avoid such a result, he reasons, the catch-all phrase should be ignored in favor of the limited class of offenders. He further supports his interpretation by asserting, again without authority, that the actions prohibited by the statute — embezzling, abstracting, purloining, and willfully misapplying— can only be accomplished by an employee or an agent. He suggests that “stealing” (which we note can be a synonym for “abstracting” оr “purloining”) would have been the better word if Congress meant for the statute to apply to a larger group of offenders.
The first rule of statutory construction is to give words their plain meaning. “It is well established that where the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts — at least where the disposition required by thе text is not absurd' — is to enforce it according to its terms.”
Lamie v. U.S. Tr.,
- U.S. -,
This broad construction of the “connected in any capacity” language comports with the purpose of the statute — to protect federal monetary interests. See
Harris,
Having decided that § 656 means what it says, 2 we must decide if Jones is “cоnnected in any capacity” with Bank One such that § 656 is applicable to him. The answer is yes. Jones, as an ATM repairman employed by NCR, provided a service for Bank One that it would otherwise have had to provide for itself. Because of his work on its behalf, Bank One granted Jones access to its property, including its ATM vaults. That special access provided him with the opportunity to steal the federally insured funds therein.
We note that other circuits passing on similar facts have unanimously found § 656’s broad “connected in any capacity” language to encompass contractors whose theft was made possible by the servicеs they provided to the banks.
See Gillett,
We find that under a plain reading of § 656, the government properly prosecuted Jones as a person who was “connected in any capacity” with Bank One.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The statute reads in pertinent part:
Whoever, being an officer, director, agent or employee of, or connected in any capacity with [any federally insured bank], ... embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully misapplies any of thе moneys, funds orcredits of such bank, ... shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years or both .... 18 U.S.C. § 656.
. Jones makes other arguments for limiting § 656’s reach by pointing to intеrpretive tools outside the statute itself, such as the statute's historical and statutory notes and a 1918 Supreme Court case interpreting a predecessor statute. We need not dwell on them, however, because not only are they unconvincing, they are extraneous. As stated previously, where the meaning of а statute is unambiguous, our sole task is to apply it straightforwardly to the facts at issue without referring to legislative history or other devices.
See
Lamie,-U.S. at-,-,