493 S.W.3d 405
Mo.2016Background
- In April 2015 the Missouri General Assembly passed HB 150; the governor vetoed it on May 5, 2015 (more than five days before adjournment). The House voted to override the veto before adjournment; the Senate did not act before adjournment.
- The legislature reconvened for an automatic September 2015 veto session (triggered by a different bill vetoed late), and during that session the Senate voted to override the governor’s veto of HB 150.
- Appellants challenged the Senate’s September override in a declaratory-judgment action, arguing Article III, § 32 permits reconsideration in the September veto session only for bills vetoed on or after the fifth day before the end of the regular session ("late-vetoed" bills).
- The circuit court sustained the State’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, upholding HB 150; the Missouri Supreme Court granted exclusive jurisdiction and reversed.
- The Supreme Court held that Article III, § 32 confines the September veto session to reconsidering only late-vetoed bills (those returned by the governor on or after the fifth day before adjournment), so the Senate lacked authority to override HB 150 in September 2015.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the September veto session may address vetoed bills not vetoed on or after the fifth day before adjournment | Appellants: Sept. veto session is limited to "late-vetoed" bills; HB 150 was vetoed earlier and therefore could not be taken up in September | State: § 32 contains no temporal restriction once a veto session is triggered; "bills returned by the governor" includes any vetoed bills | Court: Held Sept. session is limited to bills vetoed on or after the fifth day before session end (late-vetoed bills); Senate lacked authority to reconsider HB 150 in Sept. 2015 |
| Whether the legislature’s historical amendments to Art. III, § 32 show intent to limit September sessions to late-vetoed bills | Appellants: Amendments narrowed legislature’s previously broad reconsideration power and show intent to confine Sept. sessions to late-vetoed bills | State: Current text does not explicitly limit scope; plenary legislative power favors a broader reading | Court: Historical amendments demonstrate voters intended to confine the Sept. veto session to late-vetoed bills; that construction gives effect to amended language |
| Whether HB 150 was automatically tabled at adjournment under Art. III, § 20(a) such that it could not be acted on later | Appellants: Senate’s failure to act before adjournment meant HB 150 was tabled and unavailable for Sept. reconsideration | State: § 32 creates an exception allowing reconsideration in the reconvened veto session; § 20(a) does not bar the September proceedings | Court: Because HB 150 was not a late-vetoed bill and § 32 confines Sept. sessions to late vetoes, the Senate’s post-adjournment reconsideration was untimely; the court treated the Senate’s inaction as rendering it untakeable in Sept. session |
| Whether the two-house "like proceedings" requirement or the need for both houses to act in the same session forbids one house acting before adjournment and the other in the Sept. session | Appellants: The constitution contemplates a two-house process in the same session; splitting action between pre-adjournment House and post-adjournment Senate is invalid | State: The reconvened veto session is an extension of the same session and can complete the two-house process | Court: Did not reach/decide the separate questions of whether the Senate could act alone in Sept. or whether the reconvened session constitutes "like proceedings," because it resolved the case on the temporal limitation ground |
Key Cases Cited
- Thompson v. Comm. on Legislative Research, 932 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. banc 1996) (legislature has plenary power except as denied by the constitution)
- Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844 (Mo. banc 2004) (same principle of legislative plenary authority)
- State ex rel. Nixon v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 34 S.W.3d 122 (Mo. banc 2000) (standard for judgment on the pleadings)
- Neske v. City of St. Louis, 218 S.W.3d 417 (Mo. banc 2007) (constitutional provisions interpreted like statutes but given broader construction)
- Hammerschmidt v. Boone County, 877 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. banc 1994) (constitutional procedural limitations on legislation are enforced when violation is clear and undoubted)
- Brown v. Carnahan, 370 S.W.3d 637 (Mo. banc 2012) (noting limits and interplay of statutes and constitutional interpretation)