238 A.3d 961
D.C.2020Background
- Tilley was criminally charged with first-degree child sexual abuse, found incompetent to stand trial, and remained confined at St. Elizabeths while competency issues were unresolved.
- Instead of proceeding under the Ervin Act or the Citizens with Intellectual Disabilities Act after Jackson procedures, the government sought civil commitment under the District’s Sexual Psychopath Act (SPA), which stayed the criminal case.
- SPA defines a “sexual psychopath” as a person “not insane” whose course of repeated sexual misconduct evidences a lack of power to control sexual impulses; it does not itself require proof of any mental disease, disorder, or abnormality.
- Two court-appointed psychiatrists found Tilley "not insane" and, relying on his history of multiple child-sex-abuse incidents, the Superior Court found by clear and convincing evidence that he was a sexual psychopath and ordered indefinite commitment.
- The D.C. Court of Appeals held the SPA facially unconstitutional because it authorizes indefinite civil commitment without requiring a finding of a mental illness, disorder, or abnormality that seriously impairs ability to control dangerous sexual behavior, reversed the commitment, and vacated Tilley’s commitment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the SPA is facially unconstitutional under substantive due process for failing to require proof of a mental disease/disorder/abnormality that impairs control | Tilley: SPA violates due process because it permits civil commitment based on dangerousness/recidivism alone without finding a mental impairment that impedes control | Government: SPA’s statutory language requiring "lack of power to control" suffices to meet Hendricks/Crane requirements | Held: SPA is unconstitutional on its face because it does not require that the lack-of-control finding be grounded in a mental disease, disorder, or abnormality that seriously impairs control |
| Whether the court should address the unpreserved substantive-due-process challenge on appeal | Tilley: court should reach the issue to prevent clear miscarriage of justice | Government: claim was not preserved and should be forfeited or reviewed only for plain error | Held: appellate court exercised discretion to address the unpreserved pure legal question because record was complete and remand would serve no purpose |
| Whether Millard’s construction ("not insane" = "not mentally ill") saves the SPA | Tilley: Millard’s saving construction exacerbates the SPA’s problem because those with the requisite volitional impairment would likely be "insane" and thus excluded | Government: Millard’s construction limits SPA so it excludes mentally ill and therefore is constitutional | Held: Millard’s construction cannot save the SPA; it makes the statute internally inconsistent and only authorizes commitments lacking the constitutionally required mental-impairment finding |
| Whether Tilley’s commitment was supported by required findings linking dangerousness to a mental impairment | Tilley: SPA hearing failed to establish mental disorder causing impaired control; commitment unconstitutional | Government: psychiatrists testified to lack of psychosis and to pattern-based inability to control impulses (sufficient under SPA) | Held: Trial court based lack-of-control finding on recidivism alone and did not make the required Hendricks/Crane findings; but the court vacated commitment on facial unconstitutionality and did not decide other as-applied claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (construed SPA’s “not insane” to mean “not mentally ill” and warned SPA raises grave constitutional issues)
- Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (upheld similar sexual-psychopath statute against vagueness challenge)
- Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) (limits on civil confinement of criminal defendants incompetent to stand trial)
- Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (clear-and-convincing standard and due-process protection for civil commitment)
- O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (mental illness alone cannot justify indefinite confinement absent dangerousness)
- Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (dangerousness alone cannot justify civil commitment absent current mental illness)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upheld commitment scheme that requires proof of mental abnormality that makes it difficult to control behavior)
- Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407 (2002) (clarified Hendricks: proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior required, but not absolute inability)