delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellant, Charles Edwin Pearson, petitioned the Supreme Court of Minnesota for a writ of prohibition commanding the Probate Court of Ramsey County,' and its Judge, to desist from proceeding • against him as a “psychopathic personality” under Chapter 369 of the Laws of Minnesota of 1939. A proceeding under the statute had been brought in the Probate Court for the
Appellant contended that the statute violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. After hearing upon an alternative writ, the Supreme Court overruled these contentions and quashed the writ.
The statute, in § 1, defines the term “psychopathic personality” as meaning
“the existence in any person of such conditions of emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior, or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or failure to appreciate the consequences of his acts, or a combination of any such conditions, as to render such person irresponsible for his conduct with respect to sexual matters and thereby dangerous to other persons.”
Section 2 provides that, except as otherwise therein or thereafter provided, the laws relating to insane persons, or those alleged to be insane, shall apply with like force to persons having, or alleged ta have, a psychopathic personality. There is a proviso that before proceedings are instituted the facts shall first be submitted to the county, attorney who if he is satisfied, that good cause exists shall prepare a petition to be executed by a person having knowledge of the facts and shall file it with the judge of the probate court of the county in which the “patient” has his “settlement or is present.” The probate judge shall set the matter down for hearing and for examination of the “patient.” The judge may exclude the general public from attendance. The “patient” may be represented by counsel and the court may appoint counsel for him if he is financially unable to obtain such assistance. The “patient” ig entitled to compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
After setting forth the general principles which governed its determination, the state court construed the statute in these words:
“Applying these principles to the case before us, it can reasonably be said that the language of § 1 of the act is intended to include those persons who, by an habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters, have evidenced an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses and who,- as a result, are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable desire. It would not 'be reasonable to apply the provisions of the statute to every person guilty of sexual misconduct nor even to persons having strong sexual propensities. Such a definition would not only make the act impracticable of enforcement and, perhaps, unconstitutional in its application, but would also be an unwarranted departure from the accepted meaning of the words defined.”
This construction is binding upon us. Any contention that the construction is contrary to the terms of the Act is unavailing here. , For the purpose of deciding the constitutional questions appellant raises we must take the statute as though it read precisely as the highest court of the State has interpreted it.
Knights of Pythias
v.
Meyer,
This construction of the statute destroys the contention that it is too vague and indefinite to constitute valid legislation. There must be proof of a “habitual course of misconduct in sexual matters” on the part of the persons against whom a proceeding under the statute is directed, which has shown “an utter lack of power to control their sexual impulses,” and hence that they “are likely to attack or otherwise inflict- injury, loss, pain or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and uncontrollable .desire.” These underlying conditions, calling for evidence of past conduct pointing to probable consequences are as susceptible of proof as many of the criteria constantly applied in prosecutions for crime.
Nash
v.
United States,
Equally unavailing is the contention that the statute denies appellant the equal protection of the laws. The argument proceeds on the view that' the statute has selected a group which is a part of a larger class. The question, however, is whether the legislature could constitutionally make a class of the group it did select. That is, whether there is any rational basis for such a selection. We see no reason for doubt upon this point. Whether the legislature could have gone farther is not
There remains the question whether, apart from definition and classification, the procedure authorized by the statute adequately safeguards the fundamental rights embraced in the conception of due process. In this relation it is important to note that appellant has challenged the proceeding in limine by seeking to prevent the probate judge from entertaining it. To support such a challenge, the statute in its procedural aspect must -be found to be invalid on its face and not by reason of some particular application inconsistent with due process. In that light the argument on this branch of the case also fails.
As we have seen,'1 he fads must first be submitted to the county attorney who must be satisfied that good cause exists. He then draws a petition which must be “executed by a person having knowledge of the facts.” The probate judge must set the matter for hearing and for examination, of the person proceeded against. Provision is made for his representation by counsel and for compelling the production of witnesses in his behalf. The court must appoint two licensed doctors of medicine to assist in the
We fully recognize the danger of a deprivation of due process in proceedings dealing with persons charged with insanity or, as here, with a psychopathic personality as defined, in the statute,- and the special importance of maintaining the basic interests of liberty in a class of
The judgment is
Affirmed.