75 F.4th 355
4th Cir.2023Background
- Petitioner Tiger Cela, an Albanian national, was granted derivative asylum after returning to the U.S.; DHS later moved to terminate his asylum based on his 2016 federal convictions for bank fraud and aggravated identity theft.
- An IJ granted DHS’s motion to terminate asylum, found Cela removable on criminal grounds, denied his waiver and applications for withholding/CAT, and held him ineligible to adjust to lawful permanent resident (LPR) because his asylee status had been terminated.
- The BIA (three-judge panel) affirmed, interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) to require a current asylee “status” as a prerequisite to adjustment; one panel member dissented, reading the statute to allow adjustment by anyone once “granted asylum.”
- Cela petitioned the Fourth Circuit; the government argued the petition was moot because Cela returned to Albania, but the court held the case was justiciable.
- The Fourth Circuit reviewed the statutory construction de novo, considered Chevron deference (and Kisor limits), and held § 1159(b) unambiguously requires a present asylee status to “adjust” to LPR; alternatively, the BIA’s interpretation was reasonable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Cela) | Defendant's Argument (Attorney General) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prior termination of asylum bars §1159(b) adjustment | “Granted asylum” is past tense; once granted suffices; statute contains no express non-termination requirement; legislative note and Siwe support eligibility | “Status” denotes present legal condition; “adjust” implies moving from a current status; reading would avoid rendering “status” surplusage | Court: §1159(b) unambiguously requires current asylee status; Cela ineligible to adjust; petition denied |
| Mootness of petition due to Cela’s return to Albania | He was a derivative asylee and may still qualify; court can provide effectual relief (order return facilitation) | Return makes adjustment futile under §1159(b)(3) requirement to remain outside native country | Court: Not moot; case presents live controversy and can afford meaningful relief |
| Whether BIA interpretation merits Chevron deference | BIA reasonably interpreted ambiguities; prior circuit holdings support deference | N/A (court addressed Chevron but resolved on plain meaning) | Court: Resolved at Chevron step one (statute plain); alternatively, BIA interpretation is reasonable at step two, so deference would uphold the result |
Key Cases Cited
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two-step framework for judicial deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (U.S. 2019) (limits and clarifies when courts may defer to agency interpretations of their own rules)
- Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (U.S. 2017) (explains past participles may function as adjectives describing a present state)
- Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 2014) (held §1159(b) does not require continuing asylee status to apply for adjustment)
- Mahmood v. Sessions, 849 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2017) (earlier Fourth Circuit discussion of §1159(b) indicating potential ambiguity)
- Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1 (U.S. 2000) (plain statutory language controls judicial interpretation)
- United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (U.S. 2001) (Chevron deference applies only when Congress has delegated rulemaking authority to the agency)