259 So. 3d 435
La. Ct. App.2018Background
- On Sept. 1, 2012 Benjamin Tickle was arrested after officers found firearms and marijuana; he was later tried and acquitted in Jan. 2015.
- Tickle sued in federal court for malicious prosecution; federal claims were dismissed and state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice. He subsequently filed this state-law malicious prosecution suit naming District Attorney Charles J. Ballay in his official capacity.
- DA Ballay filed peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and prescription; the trial court granted the no-cause-of-action exception (dismissing DA Ballay with prejudice) and denied prescription.
- On de novo review the appellate court affirmed dismissal, concluding the petition failed to state a cause of action because prosecutorial immunity bars malicious-prosecution suits based on prosecutorial conduct in initiating and pursuing charges.
- Tickle argued immunity did not bar suits against a prosecutor in his official capacity and alleged malice and lack of probable cause; the court found these allegations concern conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase” and thus barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether alleged malicious-prosecution claims against the DA in his official capacity state a cause of action under Louisiana law | Tickle: official-capacity naming avoids individual immunity and allows suit against the office | DA Ballay: absolute prosecutorial immunity covers actions taken in initiating/pursuing prosecution even when named in official capacity | Held: Petition fails; absolute prosecutorial immunity bars the claim against DA Ballay in his official capacity |
| Whether lack of probable cause defeats prosecutorial immunity | Tickle: lack of probable cause and malice mean immunity shouldn't apply | DA Ballay: decision to charge and prosecute falls within advocacy role and is absolutely immune even if alleged to be malicious | Held: Allegations of lack of probable cause are within prosecutorial functions and do not overcome absolute immunity |
| Whether plaintiff alleged a policy or custom sufficient for an official-capacity theory | Tickle: sued office; argues office conduct warranted relief | DA Ballay: no policy/custom allegation to impute liability to the governmental entity | Held: Plaintiff pleaded no governmental policy or custom; official-capacity theory fails on that ground as well |
| Whether amendment should have been allowed after sustaining exception | Tickle: did not request amendment; generally amendment may be allowed | DA Ballay: immunity is a substantive bar; amendment would be futile | Held: Amendment would be vain/useless here because the alleged wrong is prosecutorial conduct covered by immunity; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (U.S. 1976) (establishes absolute immunity for prosecutors when initiating prosecutions and presenting the State's case)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (U.S. 1993) (distinguishes advocate functions protected by absolute immunity from administrative or investigative acts only qualifying for qualified immunity)
- Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (U.S. 2009) (reiterates that immunity depends on the prosecutor’s function; investigative/administrative tasks may not be absolutely immune)
- Graham v. Kentucky, 473 U.S. 159 (U.S. 1985) (explains individual- vs. official-capacity distinctions in federal § 1983 context and that official-capacity suits implicate the entity’s policy or custom)
- Knapper v. Connick, 681 So.2d 944 (La. 1996) (adopts Imbler reasoning under Louisiana law: prosecutors acting within their advocacy role have absolute immunity for malicious-prosecution claims)