Tibor v. Michigan Orthopaedic Institute
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168566
E.D. Mich.2014Background
- Dr. Lisa Tibor, an orthopedic surgeon, relocated from California and began working (Nov. 1, 2012) with Michigan Orthopaedic Institute (MOI) and treating patients at William Beaumont Hospital (Beaumont).
- Defendants presented a proposed (but unsigned) backdated recruitment agreement that Tibor believed violated the Stark anti-referral rules and could expose her and Defendants to False Claims Act (FCA) liability.
- Tibor refused to sign the backdated recruitment agreement and alleges she repeatedly informed Defendants of her legal concerns; she was terminated on January 17, 2013.
- Tibor sued asserting: Count I — retaliation under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (FCA); Count II — wrongful discharge in breach of Michigan public policy (pleaded in the alternative).
- Defendants moved to dismiss: they argued (a) FCA retaliation requires compliance with qui tam procedural rules, (b) Beaumont was not Tibor’s employer and lacked control to be liable, (c) Tibor did not engage in protected activity or give notice to MOI, and (d) state-law public-policy claim is preempted by the FCA.
- The district court denied dismissal of the FCA retaliation claim (Count I) on all challenged grounds but dismissed the state-law public-policy claim (Count II) as the FCA provides the exclusive remedy for such retaliatory discharge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a § 3730(h) retaliation claim must satisfy § 3730(b) qui tam procedural requirements (seal, sued in government’s name, service to DOJ) | Tibor: § 3730(h) is a standalone retaliation remedy and the qui tam procedural rules for § 3729 claims do not apply | Defendants: § 3730(h) retaliation is tied to FCA actions and must follow qui tam procedures; Eastman dicta supports dismissal | Court: Denied dismissal; § 3730(h) contains no qui tam filing/seal requirements and those procedures do not apply to standalone retaliation claims |
| Whether Beaumont can be liable under § 3730(h) despite not being Tibor’s formal employer | Tibor: 2009 amendments added contractors/agents; Beaumont’s asserted status as independent contractor/host hospital places it within § 3730(h)’s reach | Beaumont: § 3730(h) requires adverse action by an employer or entity controlling employment; Beaumont did not control Tibor’s employment | Court: Denied dismissal as § 3730(h) protects employees, contractors, and agents and is meant to cover employment-like relationships; factual questions remain about control/relationship |
| Whether Tibor alleged protected activity and notice to MOI under § 3730(h) | Tibor: She reported legal concerns about the backdated agreement internally and to counsel — this qualifies as "other efforts to stop" FCA/subchapter violations under the amended statute | MOI: Tibor did not act in furtherance of a qui tam action and thus did not engage in protected activity; MOI lacked notice | Court: Denied dismissal; post-amendment § 3730(h) protects internal reports and efforts to stop violations, and Tibor plausibly alleged she engaged in protected activity and that Defendants knew of it |
| Whether a Michigan public-policy wrongful discharge claim can proceed alongside an FCA retaliation claim | Tibor: Pleaded in the alternative; if FCA claim fails she should be allowed to pursue state-law claim | Defendants: FCA provides the statutory remedy for this type of retaliatory discharge so the state public-policy claim is preempted/exclusive remedy | Court: Granted dismissal of Count II; where a statutory remedy (FCA) exists for retaliatory discharge, no separate common-law public-policy claim lies |
Key Cases Cited
- Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544 (6th Cir.) (discussed dicta regarding FCA procedures and retaliation)
- U.S. ex rel. Marlar v. BWXT Y-12, LLC, 525 F.3d 439 (6th Cir.) (elements of an FCA retaliation claim)
- U.S. ex rel. Summers v. LHC Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 287 (6th Cir.) (qui tam procedural requirements discussed)
- Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409 (U.S.) (proving a § 3729 violation is not an element of § 3730(h))
- Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d 1056 (6th Cir.) (interpreting post-amendment scope of § 3730(h))
- Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559 (6th Cir.) (prima facie elements for retaliation claims)
- Lewandowski v. Nuclear Mgmt. Co., LLC, 272 Mich. App. 120 (Mich. Ct. App.) (statutory remedy is exclusive, barring separate public-policy wrongful discharge claim)