Thryv, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Technologies, LP, 590 U.S. 45

Inter partes review (IPR) lets third parties ask the USPTO to revisit issued patent claims; the Director (via the PTAB) decides whether to institute IPR under 35 U.S.C. §314.
Section 315(b) bars institution of IPR if the petition is filed more than one year after the petitioner (or its real party in interest or privy) was served with an infringement complaint.
Section 314(d) provides that the Director’s "determination . . . whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable."
Thryv (through predecessors) filed an IPR in 2013 against Click‑to‑Call’s patent; Click‑to‑Call argued the petition was time‑barred by a 2001 infringement suit that had been dismissed without prejudice.
The PTAB rejected the §315(b) timeliness objection, instituted review, and cancelled claims; Click‑to‑Call appealed only the §315(b) ruling. The Federal Circuit panel treated §315(b) as reviewable and vacated the Board’s decision.
The Supreme Court reversed: it held §314(d) bars judicial review of the PTAB’s application of §315(b) because §315(b) is an institution‑related statute, and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Click‑to‑Call)	Defendant's Argument (Thryv / Director)	Held
Whether §314(d) precludes judicial review of the PTAB’s application of §315(b) (one‑year time bar).	§314(d) only bars review of the Director’s §314(a) reasonable‑likelihood institution decision; §315(b) is a separate limitation and is reviewable.	§315(b) governs whether an IPR "may be instituted" and is therefore "closely tied" to the institution decision; §314(d) precludes review.	Held: §314(d) precludes judicial review of §315(b) determinations—appeals challenging timeliness essentially argue the Director should not have instituted IPR and are barred.
Whether an appeal from a final written decision under §319 can be used to review a §315(b) institution ruling.	An appeal from the Board’s final written decision is permissible under §319; that route should allow review of the §315(b) issue.	Even styled as an appeal from a final decision, the challenge still seeks to undo the institution decision and is barred by §314(d).	Held: §319 cannot be used to circumvent §314(d); such appeals remain barred.

Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 579 U.S. _ (2016) (held §314(d) generally precludes review of PTAB institution decisions)
SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu, 584 U.S. _ (2018) (held PTAB must decide all challenged claims once it institutes review and explained limits of §314(d) but does not authorize review of institution‑versus‑noninstitution procedural questions)
Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 584 U.S. _ (2018) (upheld constitutionality of IPR as public‑franchise adjudication)
Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 480 (2015) (discussed presumption of judicial review of agency action)
Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467 U.S. 340 (1984) (addressed clear congressional intent to preclude judicial review)
Wi‑Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc Federal Circuit decision holding §315(b) time‑bar determinations are reviewable)