Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom CorporationWi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corporation
Lead Opinion
Oрinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Reyna, in which Chief Judge Prost and Circuit Judges Newman, Moore, O’Malley, Wallach, Taranto, Chen, and Stoll join.
Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge O’Malley.
Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Hughes, in which Circuit Judges Lourie, Bryson, and Dyk join.
Congress has prohibited the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office from instituting inter partes review if the petition requesting that review is filed more than one year after the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint for patent infringement.
We recоgnize the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of agency actions. To overcome this presumption, Congress must clearly and convincingly indicate its intent to prohibit judicial review. We find no clear and convincing indication of such congressional intent. We therefore hold that the time-bar determinations under
I. Background
A. America Invents Act
In 2011, Congress passed the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“ALA”), which created inter partes review (“IPR”) proceedings. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a)-(c), 125 Stat. 284, 299-305 (2011);
In § 314, subsection (a) prescribes the threshold “determination]” required for the Director to institute: a “reasonable likelihood” that the petitioner will succeed in its patentability challenge to at least one of the challenged patent claims. Subsections (b) and (c) prescribe the. timing of and notice requirеments for the institution decision. And § 314(d) addresses judicial review of the Director’s IPR institution determination under § 314. Specifically, § 314(d) provides that “[t]he determination by the Director whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and nonappealable.”
The remainder of the IPR-related provisions of the AIA go beyond the preliminary procedural requirements and the preliminary determination regarding likely unpatentability.
Section 316 addresses the “conduct of’ IPRs, including amendments of the patent and evidentiary standards. Section 317 addresses settlement.
' If the Director determines to institute IPR, in most cases, the Board must “issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,” as well as any new claims added during IPR. 35 U.SU. § 318(a). Any party to IPR “dissatisfied” with the final written decision may appeal that decision to this court. Id. §§ 141(c), 319.
B. Achates
In 2015, a panel of this court decided the same issue before us today: whether § 314(d) precludes' judicial review of
C. Cuozzo
Subsequent to our decision in Achates, the Supreme Court decided Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, — U.S. -, 136-S.Ct. 2131,
The Supreme Court’s analysis of
The Supreme Court held that the presumption in favor of judicial review was overcome regarding whether a petition met,the requirements of
where a patent holder merely challenges the Patent Office’s “determin[ation] that the informatiоn presented in the petition ... shows that there is a reasonable likelihood” of success “with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged,”§ 314(a) , or where a patent holder grounds its claim in a statute closely related to that decision to institute inter partes review,§ 314(d) bars judicial review.
Id. at 2142 (alterations in original). The Supreme Court noted that the question of whether a petition was pleaded with particularity amounted to “little more than a challenge to the Patent Office’s conclusion, under
The dissent contends that the’ statutory language of
D. The Present Appeal
In 2010, Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (“Ericsson”) filed its complaint for infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 6,772,215 (“’215 patent”), 6,466,568 (“’568 patent”), and 6,424,625 (“’625 patent”) in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas against multiple defendants.
In 2013, Broadcom filed three separate petitions for IPR of the ’215, ’568, and ’625 patents.
In response to Broadcom’s petitions, Wi-Fi argued that the Director was prohibited from instituting review on any of the three petitions. Specifically, Wi-Fi argued that the Director lacked authority to institute IPR under
Wi-Fi filed a motion seeking discovery regarding indemnity agreements, defense agreements, payments, аnd email or other communications between Broadcom and the defendants in the Eastern District of Texas litigation. The Board denied both the motion and Wi-Fi’s subsequent motion for rehearing. Wi-Fi petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus, which we denied. In re Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson,
The Board instituted IPR on the challenged claims, and issued Final Written Decisions finding the challenged claims un-patentable. In the Final Written Decisions, the Board determined that Wi-Fi had not shown that Broadcom was in privity with the defendants in the Eastern District of Texas litigation, and therefore, the IPR petitions were not time-barred under
Wi-Fi appealed the Final Written Decisions, arguing, among other things, that this court should reverse or vacate the Board’s time-bar determinations. A panel of this court rejected Wi-Fi’s arguments, reasoning that Achates renders the
Wi-Fi petitioned for rehearing en banc. We granted Wi-Fi’s petition to consider whether we should overrule Achates and hold that the Director’s
Should this court overrule Achates Reference Publishing, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,803 F.3d 652 (Fed. Cir. 2015) and hold that judicial review is available for a patent owner to challenge the PTO’s determination that the petitioner satisfied the timeliness requirement of35 U.S.C. § 315(b) governing the filing of petitions for inter partes review?
Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.,
II. Discussion
As with any agency action, we apply the “strong presumption” favoring judicial review of administrative actions, including the Director’s IPR institution decisions.
In view of this strong presumption, we will abdicate judicial review only when Congress provides a “clear and convincing” indication that it intends to prohibit review. Cuozzo,
We find no clear and convincing indication in the specific statutory' language in the AIA, the specific legislative history of the AIA, or the statutory scheme as a whole that demonstrates Congress’s intent to bar judicial review of
•Starting with the statutory language,
(a) Threshold.—The Director may not authorize an inter partes review to be instituted unless the Director ■ determines that the information present in the petition filed under section 311 and any response filed under section 313 shows that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.
Subsection (a) does only two things: it identifies a threshold requirement for . institution, and as Cuozzo recоgnized, it grants the Director discretion not to institute even when the threshold is met.
(b) Patent Owner’s Action. An inter partes review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent. The time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsection (c).
The dissent states that
The time-bar determination, therefore, is not akin to either the non-initiation or preliminary-only merits detеrminations for which unreviewability is common in the law, in the latter case because the closely related final merits determination is reviewable. See supra note 7. Because
This reading is consistent with the overall statutory scheme as understood through the lens of Cuozzo’s directive to examine the statutory scheme in terms of what is “closely related” to the
Whether a petitioner has complied with
The issue that Wi-Fi appeals also is not “some minor statutory technicality.” Cuozzo,
Thus, the statutory scheme as a whole demonstrates that
Enforcing statutory limits on an agency’s authority to act is precisely the type of issue that courts have historically reviewed. See, e,g., City of Arlington v. F.C.C.,
III. Conclusion
The Supreme Court in Cuozzo instructed that the “strong presumption” favoring
REMANDED TO THE MERITS PANEL
Notes
. The Director has delegated the authority to institute IPR to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("the Board").
. The dissent's reliance on Briscoe v. Bell,
. Ericsson brought suit against D-Link Systems, Inc., Netgear, Inc., Acer, Inc., Acer America Corp., Gateway, Inc., Dell, Inc., Bel-kin International, Inc., Toshiba America Information Systems, Inc., and Toshiba Corp. Intel Corp. intervened and Ericsson amended its complaint to add Intel as a defendant. See Ericsson Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc., No. 6:10-CV-473,
.The technical aspects of the patents are not relevant to this opinion.
, Final decisions of the PTO are reviewed according to the standards provided in the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA”). Cuozzo,
. Examples include an agency's discretiоnary decision not to initiate a proceeding, Cuozzo,
. Although
, For instance, the dissent conflates “real party in interest” as used in
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I agree with much of the majority’s thoughtful reasoning, and I certainly agree with its conclusion that time-bar determinations under
As we explained in Intellectual Ventures II LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.,
The PTO’s own regulations support this reading of
This conclusion not only is consistent with, but, in my view, is dictated by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, — U.S. -,
In deciding that the presumption in favor of judicial review was overcome in that case, the Court analyzed and distinguished Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management,
The Cuozzo majority characterized Lin-dahl’s, interpretation of its particular statute as “presenting] the agency’s primacy over its сore statutory function in accord with Congress’ intent,” and declared that its “interpretation of the ‘No Appeal’ provision [in the ALA] has the same effect.” Id. This is because Congress, in enacting the ALA, recognized that the “core statutory function” of the PTO is to make pat-entability determinations, and chose to insulate from judicial review preliminary determinations by the PTO as to whether IPR petitions “show[ ] that there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”
Put another way,
A détermination by the PTO whether an IPR petition is time-barred under
Congress is well versed in establishing statutory time bars. Congressional discretion should control the application of such time bars, not that of the Director of the PTO. I do not see the need to say more.
Dissenting Opinion
joined by' LOURIE, BRYSON, and DYK, Cirсuit Judges, dissenting.
Congress barred judicial review of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) Director’s decision to institute inter partes review (IPR) in
In Cuozzo, the Supreme Court held that
I
Our inquiry should start and end with the words of the statute. The APA exempts agency actions from judicial review “to the extent that statutes preclude judicial review.”
Congress’s intent to prohibit judicial review of the Board’s IPR institution decision is clear and unmistakable.
Cuozzo confirms this interpretation of
The petition’s timeliness under
This court, however, confines the scope of the judicial review bar in
To sidestep this binding precedent, the majority states that
The dissent, like the panel dissent in the Court of Appeals, would limit the scopе of the “No Appeal” provision to interlocutory appeals, leaving a court free to review the initial decision to institute review in the context of the agency’s final decision. We cannot accept this interpretation. It reads into the provision a limitation (to interlocutory decisions) that the language nowhere mentions and that is unnecessary. The Administrative Procedure Act already limits review to final agency decisions. The Patent Office’s decision to initiate inter partes review is “preliminary,” not “final.” And the agency’s decision to deny a petition is a matter committed to the Patent Office’s discretion. So, read as limited to such preliminary and discretionary decisions, the “No Appeal” provision would seem superfluous.
Id. (citations omitted).
The majority concludes that the appeal bar does not apply to “limits on the Director’s statutory authority to institute,” Maj Op. at 1374. But this position was clearly rejected in Cuozzo,
Briscoe involved the Voting Rights Act, which allowed the Attorney General to determine whether “the preconditions for application of the Act to particular jurisdictions are met.” Id. at 407,
Ñor does the phrase “under this section” in
II
The plain language of
The difference between-
Even before the AIA, third-parties could seek administrative patent cancellation through reexamination. When the PTO receives a request for reexamination, the Director, must determine whether the request raises a substantial new question of patentability. And
In stark contrast, Congress used markedly different language for inter partes review and post-grant review proceedings. Instead of barring review of the Director’s determination of a specific issue,
Ill
Even if we followed the majority’s approach and tried to parse out which requirements for institution are barred from judicial review under
Under
The majority tries to distinguish between the real party in interest inquiry under
To illustrate why this distinction is flawed, suppose that a patent owner argues that an unidentified third-party, who has not been sued for infringement, is a real party in interest to the petition. The Director disagrees with the patent owner and institutes review. No one disputes that the Director’s decision on real party in interest is unreviewable in this scenario. Now suppose the Director makes the exact same determination, but with respect to a third-party who was sued more than one year before the petition was filed. Even though the Director is making the same factual inquiry, his determination now becomes reviewable because it implicates the
The facts of this appeal underscore why timeliness under
Vacating the Board’s invalidity decision on the basis of threshold questions like timeliness or real parties in interest will squander the time and resources spent adjudicating the actual merits of the petition. This is counter to the AIA’s purpose of “providing quick and cost effective alternatives to litigation.” H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011). Congress recognized this issue, so it prohibited this court from reviewing the Board’s institution decision. It is not our prerogative to second-guess that policy decision, nor should we rely on tenuous statutory interpretations to undermine it.
IV
Because we do not have jurisdiction to review the Board’s determination that Broadcom’s petition was timely filed, I respectfully dissent.
. This was similarly true under the old