Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC v. Mick
886 F.3d 626
7th Cir.
2018

Background

  • Thorncreek Apartments (three LLCs: I, II, III) sued the Village of Park Forest and ten officials alleging constitutional and state civil-rights violations arising from zoning enforcement, denial of permits, and related regulatory actions after relocation of the leasing office.
  • The cases were consolidated; a 13-day jury trial addressed § 1983 class-of-one and race-based equal-protection claims, § 1985/1986 conspiracy and failure-to-prevent-conspiracy claims, and Illinois Civil Rights Act claims.
  • Jury verdict: Village and Village Manager Mick liable on a § 1983 class-of-one claim; Mick and Community Development Director Kerestes found liable on a § 1985(3) conspiracy claim; Thorncreek II awarded $2,014,000 compensatory damages; Thorncreek I and III awarded $1 each; punitive damages nominally awarded to Mick and Kerestes.
  • Post-trial, the district court set aside the § 1985 verdict as to Kerestes (because no predicate race-based equal-protection violation was found), awarded prejudgment interest, and awarded attorney’s fees and costs (fees materially reduced from the request).
  • Both sides appealed discrete rulings: denial of judgment as a matter of law (Mick), Thorncreek’s motion for new trial on damages (including alleged improper references to owner Clapper’s wealth and discovery/expert issues), prejudgment interest, and the fee award amount.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether Mick was entitled to JMOL because § 1985(3) verdict lacked race-based predicate Thorncreek: N/A (plaintiff prevailed on class-of-one claim) Mick: § 1985(3) verdict invalid without predicate so verdict against him must be vacated Denied: Mick didn’t challenge the class-of-one § 1983 judgment; that verdict and punitive damages supported judgment against him despite § 1985 defect
Whether trial references to owner Clapper’s wealth required new trial on damages Thorncreek: passing references and closing argument remarks unfairly prejudiced jury and affected damages Village: references were minor, judge instructed jurors to disregard, Thorncreek waived objections during closings Denied: stray testimony was harmless; failure to timely object waived many claims; no overwhelming probability of prejudice
Whether nominal $1 awards to Thorncreek I and III were inconsistent with damages to II and required new trial Thorncreek: awards inconsistent and contrary to reason Village: evidence supported different treatment of the entities based on who was harmed and who faced enforcement actions Denied: jury rationally treated entities differently given record; denial of new trial not abuse of discretion
Whether prejudgment interest should be awarded when plaintiff’s damages submissions included interest Thorncreek: entitled to prejudgment interest Village: plaintiff’s submitted damages already included interest so presumption against awarding additional interest Affirmed: district court found jury likely did not include interest (it simply subtracted mortgage from value), so awarding prejudgment interest was not an abuse of discretion
Whether district court abused discretion in reducing requested attorney’s fees Thorncreek: sought large fee based on lodestar Village: partial success, nominal awards for two plaintiffs, primarily factual issues, public benefit limited Affirmed: court properly started with lodestar then reduced for limited success and other Hensley/Farrar factors; resulting fee reasonable

Key Cases Cited

  • Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613 (7th Cir.) (§ 1985(3) requires race- or class-based discriminatory animus)
  • Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (U.S. 1971) (scope of § 1985 conspiracies requiring class-based animus)
  • United States v. Suggs, 374 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004) (definition of unfairly prejudicial evidence)
  • Solyts v. Costello, 520 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2008) (presumption jurors follow limiting instructions)
  • Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599 (7th Cir. 2002) (standard for showing inability to disregard inadmissible evidence)
  • Venson v. Altamirano, 749 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2014) (waiver by failing to object to motion-in-limine violation)
  • Houskins v. Sheahan, 549 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2008) (preservation rules for in limine rulings)
  • Darif v. Holder, 739 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 2014) (arguments raised first in reply brief are waived)
  • Willis v. Lepine, 687 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2012) (plain-error standard in civil cases)
  • Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care–USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431 (7th Cir. 1989) (prejudgment interest presumptively available for federal-law violations)
  • Raybestos Prods. Co. v. Younger, 54 F.3d 1234 (7th Cir. 1995) (prejudgment interest is compensatory, not punitive)
  • Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1992) (fee awards depend on degree of success; nominal damages generally do not support large fees)
  • Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Ind. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (U.S. 1989) (degree of success informs fee awards)
  • Pickett v. Sheridan Health Care Ctr., 664 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 2011) (lodestar method for fee calculation)
  • Estate of Enoch v. Tienor, 570 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 2009) (lodestar as starting point and considerations for adjustments)
  • Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542 (U.S. 2010) (lodestar presumptively reasonable)
  • Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (U.S. 1983) (reducing fees for limited success)
  • Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2003) (factors for awarding fees in nominal-damages cases)
  • Maul v. Constan, 23 F.3d 143 (7th Cir. 1994) (public-benefit inquiry for fee eligibility)
  • Montanez v. Simon, 755 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014) (district court’s broad discretion in adjusting lodestar)
  • Khan v. Gallitano, 180 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 1999) (abuse-of-discretion standard for fee awards)

A FFIRMED.

Read the full case