Thompson v. United States, 924 F.3d 1153

Thompson, a Bahamian boat captain, was convicted in 2008 of drug- and alien-smuggling offenses and of three counts of federal second-degree murder (18 U.S.C. § 1111) for forcing non-swimming passengers into the ocean, resulting in three drownings.
He was also convicted of two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for carrying/brandishing a firearm in relation to those murder offenses; the § 924(c) counts carried consecutive prison terms.
Thompson filed a second, authorized § 2255 motion arguing his § 924(c) convictions are invalid after Johnson and Dimaya because his § 1111 second-degree murders are not "crimes of violence."
The district court denied relief, ruling § 924(c)’s residual clause was not invalid as applied (citing Eleventh Circuit precedent) and alternatively holding § 1111 second-degree murder qualifies under § 924(c)’s elements clause.
On appeal the Eleventh Circuit (en banc precedent and prior panel decisions) controlled: Ovalles II upheld § 924(c)’s residual clause under a conduct-based interpretation; Jones held Florida second-degree murder satisfies an elements-clause test; the court concluded federal § 1111 second-degree murder is materially indistinguishable from Florida law and therefore a categorical crime of violence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 924(c)(3)(B) (residual clause) is unconstitutionally vague so Thompson's § 924(c) convictions fail	Thompson: Johnson/Dimaya render § 924(c) residual clause void; predicate murder no longer a crime of violence	Government: Eleventh Circuit precedent (Ovalles II) interprets § 924(c)(3)(B) to avoid vagueness; residual clause remains valid	Denied — claim foreclosed by Ovalles II; moreover the indictment charges conduct that satisfies the conduct-based residual-clause test
Whether federal second-degree murder (18 U.S.C. § 1111) categorically qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 924(c)(3)(A) (elements clause)	Thompson: § 1111 lacks the requisite element of use of physical force, so it cannot serve as a predicate	Government: Federal § 1111 requires an actual killing with malice aforethought; that element necessarily involves force capable of causing physical injury	Held — § 1111 second-degree murder categorically qualifies under the elements clause (Jones controls; alternative textual/precedential reasoning supports this)

Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (interpreting § 924(c)(3)(B) via a conduct-based approach and rejecting vagueness challenge)
United States v. Jones, 906 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 2018) (concluding Florida second-degree murder satisfies elements-clause violent-felony test)
Hylor v. United States, 896 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2018) (Florida attempted first-degree murder qualifies under elements clause)
Solomon v. United States, 911 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2019) (panel explaining limitations on successive § 2255 relief after Ovalles II and In re Garrett)
United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2009) (prior-panel-precedent rule discussion)
Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) ("physical force" means force capable of causing physical pain or injury)
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (ACCA residual clause decision)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (applying Johnson to strike down analogous residual clause)
Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (reaffirming the "capable of causing physical pain or injury" standard)