Thompson v. Dauphinais
217 F. Supp. 3d 1023
D. Alaska
2016

Background

  • Plaintiffs (individual donors and a GOP subdivision) sued Alaska officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging four provisions of Alaska campaign-finance law violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments; bench trial concluded May 2016.
  • Challenged provisions: (1) $500 annual individual-to-candidate and individual-to-group base limits (Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(b)); (2) $3,000 annual nonresident aggregate limit for certain offices (Alaska Stat. 15.13.072(e)(3)); and (3) $5,000 political-party aggregate limit to municipal candidates (Alaska Stat. 15.13.070(d)(4) and related definitions).
  • Plaintiffs are regular contributors (some blocked by limits); District 18 was limited by party-aggregate rules when making a municipal contribution.
  • The State presented expert and eyewitness evidence (including testimony about the VECO corruption scandal and Alaska’s small legislature, reliance on resource industries, and geography) to show a pervasive risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance in Alaska.
  • Court applied Ninth Circuit “closely drawn” contribution-test framework (Eddleman/Lair) and the post-Citizens United rule that only quid pro quo corruption or its appearance can justify contribution limits.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Are Alaska’s $500 individual-to-candidate and individual-to-group annual limits constitutional? $500 is unconstitutionally low and not closely drawn to prevent quid pro quo; limits impede effective campaigning (especially challengers) and were enacted for impermissible purposes. Limits further anti-corruption interest in Alaska (demographics, small legislature, resource dependence, VECO history); lower limits reduce dependence on large donors and prevent circumvention via groups. Upheld: $500 limits further preventing quid pro quo/appearance and are closely drawn (leave affiliation intact and permit effective campaigns).
Is the $3,000 nonresident aggregate limit constitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments? Aggregating nonresident contributions discriminates by residency without nexus to corruption; strict scrutiny should apply or First Amendment invalidates such residency-based aggregation. Limit targets out-of-state money to prevent appearance of outside influence in a state highly susceptible to outside industry influence; evidence established a nexus to anti-corruption. Upheld on First Amendment record: State showed nexus to anti-corruption; court did not apply or resolve stricter tailoring question raised by plaintiffs. Equal protection/privileges-or-immunities claims rejected.
Is the $5,000 political-party aggregate limit unconstitutional because of aggregation across party components? Aggregation of subordinate party units impermissibly burdens associational rights and treats party components discriminatorily. Party units voluntarily affiliate; parties are treated more favorably than non-party groups; plaintiffs failed to show First Amendment injury. Rejected: plaintiffs failed to show how party-aggregate rule burdens First Amendment rights under their theory; no relief.
Which constitutional test applies and what is the controlling anti-corruption interest after Citizens United? (Plaintiffs sought application of Randall factors.) Court follows Ninth Circuit precedent (Eddleman/Lair) applying a three-part “closely drawn” test; after Citizens United only quid pro quo corruption or its appearance can justify contribution limits. Applied Eddleman/Lair closely-drawn analysis; accepted that only quid pro quo/appearance is a sufficiently important interest post-Citizens United.

Key Cases Cited

  • Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (establishes contribution/expenditure distinction and reasonableness standard for contribution limits)
  • McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014) (plurality: narrows permissible interests to quid pro quo corruption/appearance; scrutinizes aggregate limits)
  • Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (affirms speech protections for independent expenditures; informs anti-corruption scope)
  • FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003) (upholds certain source-based limits and recognizes anti-circumvention interest)
  • Montana Right to Life Ass’n v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003) (articulates Ninth Circuit’s three-part "closely drawn" test for contribution limits)
  • Lair v. Bullock, 798 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2015) (directs district courts to apply Eddleman rather than Randall in Ninth Circuit)
  • Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (plurality opinion discussing tailoring concerns and risk that overly low limits harm challengers)
  • Shrink Missouri Gov't PAC v. Nixon, 528 U.S. 377 (2000) (recognizes limits can be invalid if so low they prevent effective advocacy)
Read the full case