Thompson v. Clark
596 U.S. 36
| SCOTUS | 2022Background
- In Jan. 2014 Thompson was accused by a relative of abusing his newborn; EMTs and four police officers entered his Brooklyn apartment without a warrant after he refused entry.
- Officers arrested Thompson for resisting entry/obstructing; the baby was medically cleared (diaper rash); Thompson was detained two days and later released.
- Prosecutor moved to dismiss pretrial and the court dismissed the charges without explanation.
- Thompson sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 asserting a Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim; district court and Second Circuit dismissed his claim under Second Circuit precedent requiring an affirmative indication of innocence.
- Circuits were split on whether a "favorable termination" requires an affirmative indication of innocence or merely the absence of a conviction; the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve that question.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| What satisfies the Fourth Amendment §1983 "favorable termination" element for malicious prosecution? | Thompson: favorable termination = prosecution ended without a conviction. | Clark: requires affirmative indication of innocence (e.g., acquittal or dismissal stating insufficient evidence). | The Court: only requires that the prosecution ended without a conviction. |
| Is the Fourth Amendment malicious-prosecution claim properly analogized to the common-law malicious-prosecution tort (1871)? | Thompson: yes—malicious prosecution is the most analogous tort and guides elements. | Clark/Dissent: Fourth Amendment seizure claim is distinct; false arrest/imprisonment are better analogs. | The Court: adopts the historical malicious-prosecution analogy and looks to 1871 tort practice. |
| Does historical tort law require an affirmative indication of innocence to satisfy favorable termination? | Thompson: historical consensus allowed post-1871 favorable termination so long as no conviction. | Clark: points to later authorities (Restatement) and some courts requiring indication of innocence. | The Court: historical consensus (as of 1871) did not require an affirmative indication; dismissal without explanation is sufficient. |
| Does adopting the no-affirmative-indication rule unduly expose officers to suits? | Thompson: no—officers remain protected by probable-cause requirement and qualified immunity. | Clark/Dissent: rule blurs doctrinal boundaries and creates uncertainty about elements (malice, seizure, timing of probable cause). | The Court: held protections remain via probable cause and qualified immunity; left other questions (seizure, probable cause at specific times, qualified immunity) for remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Manuel v. Joliet, 580 U.S. 357 (2017) (framework for Fourth Amendment §1983 claims and analogy to common-law torts)
- Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994) (addresses prosecution-without-probable-cause claims; plurality discussion relevant to analytical home)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (favorable termination principle to avoid inconsistent judgments)
- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (Fourth Amendment governs pretrial deprivations and judicial probable-cause review)
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (separate actionable claims for unreasonable seizure not necessarily barred by subsequent conviction)
- Lanning v. Glens Falls, 908 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2018) (Second Circuit precedent requiring affirmative indication of innocence)
- Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2009) (court holding that favorable termination requires indication of innocence)
- Cordova v. Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645 (10th Cir. 2016) (same)
- Laskar v. Hurd, 972 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2020) (contrasting view: favorable termination = absence of conviction)