Thomas v. Town of Salisbury
909 F.3d 483
| 1st Cir. | 2018Background
- In 2010 Salisbury town manager Cornelius Harrington hired retired police chief Robert St. Pierre to investigate misconduct allegations against then‑police chief David L’Esperance; St. Pierre’s report also alleged wrongdoing by officer Mark Thomas.
- St. Pierre conducted a follow‑up investigation into Thomas at Harrington’s request; Thomas was placed on paid administrative leave and later terminated by Harrington based on that report.
- An arbitrator reinstated Thomas, ordered back pay, and found insufficient evidence to support the termination; Thomas soon thereafter took long‑term sick leave and retired in 2015.
- Thomas sued Harrington, St. Pierre, Salisbury, and others asserting federal and state claims; only claims against Harrington and St. Pierre (civil conspiracy) and against Harrington (MCRA interference with property right of employment) survived dismissal.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on the remaining claims; the First Circuit affirmed, finding insufficient evidence of an unlawful conspiracy or the “threats, intimidation or coercion” required by the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Civil conspiracy (concerted action / substantial assistance) — whether Harrington and St. Pierre agreed or substantially assisted a wrongful plan to deprive Thomas of employment | Harrington and St. Pierre had a prior relationship, coordinated communications, and investigatory irregularities showing a common plan to oust Thomas | Communications show only lawful retention and investigation; no evidence St. Pierre knew of any tortious purpose or agreed to one; no substantial assistance with unlawful intent | Affirmed: record insufficient to infer an agreement or that St. Pierre knowingly and substantially assisted a tortious plan |
| MCRA (Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 12 §§ 11H, 11I) — whether Harrington used threats, intimidation, or coercion to deprive Thomas of protected employment | Harrington distributed the report (to press and allegedly to Bar Overseers), influenced chief to restrict Thomas’s moonlighting, and otherwise pressured Thomas into leaving | Disclosure was FOIA‑driven or unproven; restrictions on moonlighting were unilaterally and narrowly applied by the chief to avoid conflicts; conduct falls short of coercion standard | Affirmed: non‑physical coercion standard narrow; evidence does not show threats, intimidation, or coercion sufficient to invoke MCRA |
| Qualified immunity (as applied to MCRA claim) — whether Harrington is immune if claim existed | Thomas contended Harrington’s conduct violated clearly established rights | Because MCRA claim fails on the merits, court did not reach qualified immunity in detail | Not decided because plaintiff’s MCRA claim fails on substantive grounds |
| Summary judgment standard — whether material factual disputes precluded summary judgment | Thomas argued inferences from communications and witness statements create triable issues | Defendants argued the record lacks evidence of agreement, wrongful intent, or coercive acts; summary judgment appropriate | Affirmed: viewing evidence in plaintiff’s favor, no genuine dispute of material fact that would sustain conspiracy or MCRA claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. Am. Chemistry Council, 576 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (explains conspiracy theories: concerted action and substantial assistance under Massachusetts law)
- Kyte v. Phillip Morris Inc., 556 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. 1990) (requires knowledge and evidence of agreement or awareness for conspiracy liability)
- Kurker v. Hill, 689 N.E.2d 833 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (discusses substantial assistance/aiding and abetting standard under Massachusetts law)
- Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. P&B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546 (1st Cir. 1994) (conspiracy inference may arise from pattern of conduct; contrasted here)
- Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Blake, 631 N.E.2d 985 (Mass. 1994) (defines "threats, intimidation, or coercion" under the MCRA)
- Nolan v. CN8, 656 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2011) (notes narrowness of non‑physical coercion exception under MCRA)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (summary judgment evidentiary standard)
- Meuser v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 564 F.3d 507 (1st Cir. 2009) (discusses requisite level of pressure for MCRA economic/non‑physical coercion claims)