60 F.4th 209
4th Cir.2023Background
- Torrence had a 1979 armed-robbery conviction; armed robbery was not statutorily a "violent" offense at that time.
- In 1986 South Carolina listed armed robbery as a violent offense and made certain "subsequent violent" offenders ineligible for parole.
- Torrence was paroled in 1985, later charged in 1987 murders, convicted in 1992 and sentenced to life with parole ineligibility for 30 years.
- In 1993 the legislature added subsection (B) to define violent crimes by reference to the offense date and included a savings clause; that amendment took effect Jan 1, 1994, but subsection (B) and the related savings-language were repealed in Jan 1995.
- In 2004 the Department notified Torrence he was permanently ineligible for parole based on his 1979 conviction; Torrence argued the 1994 statute vested his parole-eligibility right and claimed a federal due-process violation.
- Procedural history: Torrence pursued state PCR and administrative appeals; filed § 2254 habeas; district court granted summary judgment to respondent; Fourth Circuit granted COA on vesting/due-process question and affirmed the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Torrence acquired a vested federal right to parole eligibility when the 1993 Act (effective Jan 1, 1994) briefly made violent-status depend on the offense date and included a savings clause | Torrence: the 1994 savings clause permanently vested his right to have his 1979 robbery treated as nonviolent, so the Department's 2004 denial violated due process | Respondent: any dispute over parole-eligibility rests on state-law interpretation; federal habeas cannot grant relief for errors of state law and Torrence received required process | Court: Claim is principally a state-law dispute; even assuming a liberty interest, federal review is limited to procedural protections and Torrence received the minimal process required, so no federal due-process violation |
| Whether federal habeas review can correct state parole-eligibility determinations or only ensure minimal procedural protections | Torrence: asks federal court to recognize vested right and overturn parole-eligibility decision | Respondent: parole-eligibility is a question of state law; federal habeas review is limited to federal constitutional claims about process | Court: Followed Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent—parole-eligibility is a state-law issue not cognizable on federal habeas except to review whether the State provided the minimal procedures required by due process (e.g., statement of reasons) |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991) (federal habeas does not lie for mere errors of state law)
- Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011) (federal review of parole decisions is limited to minimal due-process protections: opportunity to be heard and statement of reasons)
- Vann v. Angelone, 73 F.3d 519 (4th Cir. 1996) (parole-eligibility is a state-law question; federal habeas review limited to procedural due process)
- Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1999) (reiterating that parole eligibility is not cognizable on federal habeas)
- Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (recognizing that a state-created parole system can give rise to a liberty interest requiring minimal due process)
- Weeks v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 1999) (federal habeas relief limited when claim rests on state-law interpretation)