Thomas Kelsey v. State of Florida
206 So. 3d 5
| Fla. | 2016Background
- Thomas Kelsey committed nonhomicide sexual crimes at age 15 (2002); identified in 2008 and pleaded guilty in 2009.
- originally sentenced in 2010 to two life terms plus concurrent 25‑year terms; after Graham, he sought relief and was resentenced in January 2014 to concurrent 45‑year terms.
- Kelsey appealed; First DCA affirmed, holding his 45‑year concurrent terms did not constitute a de facto life sentence warranting relief under the 2014 juvenile‑sentencing statute, and certified a question of great public importance.
- The Florida Supreme Court granted review to decide whether juveniles whose original sentences violated Graham and who were resentenced before July 1, 2014, are entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014‑220 (the 2014 juvenile sentencing law).
- The Court held that Graham applies to juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to terms >20 years and that Henry/Horsley require application of chapter 2014‑220 to all juveniles with Graham‑invalid sentences, including those resentenced prior to the statute’s effective date.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Kelsey) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a juvenile whose original sentence violated Graham and who was resentenced before July 1, 2014, is entitled to resentencing under chapter 2014‑220 | Kelsey: his post‑Graham 45‑year term still fails to guarantee a meaningful opportunity for release and thus he should get review/resentencing under chapter 2014‑220 | State: post‑Graham resentencing to a term of years (here 45 years) may cure the Graham violation and preclude application of the 2014 statute; not all resentencings require the statute | Held: Yes — such juveniles are entitled to resentencing/judicial review under chapter 2014‑220 when their sentences meet the statute’s criteria (>20 years) or otherwise violate Graham (affirmative answer) |
| Whether a term‑of‑years must be a "de facto life" to trigger Graham relief | Kelsey: Graham applies regardless of whether a term equals de facto life if it denies meaningful opportunity for release | State/First DCA: only de facto life terms (e.g., aggregate terms that functionally ensure no meaningful opportunity) should trigger Henry/Horsley relief | Held: Graham is not limited to nominal life sentences; courts look to whether the sentence denies meaningful opportunity for release — chapter 2014‑220 applies consistent with Henry |
| Whether resentencing under the statute would violate double jeopardy / finality | Kelsey: no finality because the original life sentence became illegal; jeopardy attached only to a lawful sentence | State: resentencing again (potentially to life) would upset finality and double jeopardy principles | Held: Jeopardy attaches only to a lawful sentence; Kelsey’s prior life sentence was illegal after Graham, so resentencing under the statute does not violate double jeopardy and the State may seek life consistent with Graham and the individualized factors |
| Whether the State may seek a greater sentence (including life) on remand | Kelsey: argues reasonable expectation of finality in 45 years; opposes greater term | State: may seek life if sentencing court, using individualized Graham factors, deems it appropriate | Held: State may seek life, but resentencing must apply the individualized factors in section 921.1401(2); majority notes that such a life sentence is unlikely except for the rare irreparably corrupt juvenile (concurrence emphasizes practical unlikelihood) |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (categorical rule: life without parole banned for juvenile nonhomicide offenders unless state provides meaningful opportunity for release)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional)
- Henry v. State, 175 So.3d 675 (Fla. 2015) (Florida court: Graham applies to term‑of‑years sentences that deny meaningful opportunity for release; legislative remedy required)
- Horsley v. State, 160 So.3d 393 (Fla. 2015) (remedy: apply 2014 juvenile‑sentencing statute to juvenile sentences invalid under Miller/Graham)
- Dunbar v. State, 89 So.3d 901 (Fla. 2012) (jeopardy attaches only to a legal sentence)
- Landrum v. State, 192 So.3d 459 (Fla. 2016) (chapter 2014‑220 sets forth individualized factors to consider when imposing life for juvenile offenders)