Thomas D. Arthur v. Kim Tobias Thomas
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 214
| 11th Cir. | 2014Background
- Thomas Arthur, a death-sentenced inmate, filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1991 conviction and 1992 death sentence for the murder of Troy Wicker; the petition was filed in April 2001 well after AEDPA’s one-year limitations period expired (conviction became final June 18, 1998).
- Arthur pursued multiple state and federal proceedings over decades (three trials, direct appeals, two Rule 32 proceedings, DNA testing, successive appeals); state and federal courts repeatedly found the evidence of guilt substantial and denied postconviction relief.
- The district court dismissed Arthur’s § 2254 petition in 2002 as untimely under AEDPA, finding no statutory or equitable tolling and rejecting his actual-innocence assertions; this dismissal was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.
- After the Supreme Court’s decisions in Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler (recognizing a narrow equitable exception to procedural default for ineffective-trial-counsel claims not raised in initial state collateral review), Arthur moved under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) (May 2012) to reopen the final judgment dismissing his § 2254 petition.
- The district court denied the Rule 60(b)(6) motion, holding (1) a change in decisional law alone is not the extraordinary circumstance required by Rule 60(b)(6), and (2) Martinez/Trevino are inapplicable because Arthur’s petition was barred by AEDPA’s statute of limitations—not by state-law procedural default in initial-review collateral proceedings—and his claims had been fully litigated.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed: Martinez/Trevino do not apply to AEDPA time-bar dismissals, and even if they did, the change in law is not an ‘‘extraordinary circumstance’’ warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Arthur) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Martinez/Trevino provide equitable grounds to reopen a final AEDPA time-bar dismissal via Rule 60(b)(6) | Martinez/Trevino create an equitable basis to excuse Arthur’s failure to file timely because trial-counsel ineffectiveness was not adequately raised earlier | Martinez/Trevino address procedural default in state collateral review, not AEDPA limitations; Arthur’s petition was untimely under federal law | Martinez/Trevino do not apply to AEDPA statute-of-limitations dismissals; Rule 60(b)(6) relief denied |
| Whether a change in decisional law (Martinez/Trevino) is an “extraordinary circumstance” under Rule 60(b)(6) | The new Supreme Court decisions are a law change that justifies reopening to avoid miscarriage of justice | A change in decisional law is insufficient; Gonzalez and Howell foreclose relief based solely on intervening law | Change in law (including Martinez) is not an extraordinary circumstance; no Rule 60(b)(6) relief |
| Whether Arthur demonstrated extraordinary circumstances otherwise (actual innocence, diligence, inability to obtain counsel) | Arthur asserts actual innocence and that lack of appointed collateral counsel prevented timely filings | State shows Arthur was aware of deadlines, failed to use state or federal mechanisms to obtain counsel, and evidence of guilt is strong | Arthur did not meet the extraordinary-circumstance threshold: no compelling actual-innocence showing and no diligence warranting tolling |
| Whether Arthur’s ineffective-trial-counsel claims are substantial under Martinez | Arthur summarized multiple ineffective-assistance claims (investigation, mitigation, conflict of interest) arguing some merit | State notes claims were litigated or available on direct appeal; Arthur could have sought counsel under state/federal procedures | Court declined to reach merits because Martinez does not apply; also found Arthur failed to show the substantiality required even if Martinez applied |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (narrow equitable exception excusing procedural default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims not raised in initial-review state collateral proceedings)
- Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (2013) (extends Martinez to jurisdictions where direct appeal procedures make it practically impossible to raise ineffective-assistance claims)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (change in decisional law generally is not an extraordinary circumstance under Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen a habeas time-bar dismissal)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default doctrine; attorney error in state collateral proceedings generally does not constitute cause to excuse default)
- Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010) (clarifies equitable tolling standard for AEDPA)
- Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000) (what constitutes a "properly filed" state petition for tolling purposes)
- Arthur v. Allen, 452 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2006) (Eleventh Circuit decision rejecting statutory and equitable tolling arguments and actual-innocence showing in Arthur’s earlier appeal)
- Howell v. Secretary, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 730 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying Gonzalez to hold change in law does not itself establish extraordinary circumstances for Rule 60(b)(6))
- Booker v. Singletary, 90 F.3d 440 (11th Cir. 1996) (Rule 60(b)(6) relief is extraordinary and requires extraordinary circumstances)