Thomas Crangle v. Bennie Kelly, 838 F.3d 673

In 2007 Crangle pleaded guilty in Ohio to rape (life with parole eligibility after 10 years); at plea and sentencing the judge and defense counsel told him he would not be subject to post-release control, and the sentencing entry omitted post-release control despite a plea form checkmark indicating it "will" apply.
Crangle’s direct appeal concluded in November 2008; conviction became final December 20, 2008, after he did not seek Ohio Supreme Court review.
In June 2010 the Ohio Supreme Court decided State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick, holding post-release control is mandatory for certain sex offenses and directing trial courts to issue corrected sentencing entries.
After learning of Carnail in August 2010, Crangle moved to withdraw his plea and the trial court issued a November 19, 2010 nunc pro tunc judgment adding a mandatory five-year post-release control term (backdated to the original sentence); state courts later denied further relief and review.
Crangle filed a federal § 2254 habeas petition in April 2013 raising ineffective assistance and due-process claims tied to the post-release control error; the district court dismissed as untimely, but the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the November 19, 2010 nunc pro tunc order is a "new judgment" that restarts AEDPA's one-year clock under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).	Crangle: the nunc pro tunc order changed his sentence by imposing mandatory post-release control and thus created a new judgment that restarts the limitations period.	State: the nunc pro tunc merely corrected the record; post-release control is substantively equivalent to parole, so sentence unchanged and limitations not reset.	Majority: The nunc pro tunc order changed the substance of Crangle’s sentence (post-release control imposes materially different sanctions), so it was a new judgment that restarted AEDPA’s one-year clock; the petition was timely.
Whether the November 2010 order (and Carnail) supply a "factual predicate" and show due diligence so § 2244(d)(1)(D) restarts the limitations period.	Crangle (as emphasized in concurrence): the nunc pro tunc order is a factual predicate under Johnson v. United States; he acted promptly after Carnail, showing due diligence.	State: new case law or a later decision cannot serve as a factual predicate to restart the clock; petitioner had constructive notice earlier.	Majority: did not decide § 2244(d)(1)(D). Concurring judge: would hold the nunc pro tunc order is a factual predicate and Crangle acted with due diligence, providing an alternative basis to restart the clock.

Ruiz v. United States, 536 U.S. 622 (discussing plea-related disclosure and knowing/voluntary plea principles)
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (resentencing produces a new judgment for habeas purposes)
King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154 (6th Cir.) (a new sentence/judgment permits challenges to the new sentence and the undisturbed conviction; a new judgment normally resets AEDPA clock)
Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (sentence is part of the judgment; worse new sentence can create new judgment)
Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (a state-court vacatur or similar state-court order can be a "factual predicate" under § 2255/§ 2244(d)(1)(D) if discovered with due diligence)
State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick, 126 Ohio St. 3d 124 (Ohio 2010) (Ohio Supreme Court held mandatory post-release control must be included for certain felony sex convictions)
Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403 (6th Cir.) (discussing misadvice about post-release control and plea validity)